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Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to analyse strategies within the political elite in Somaliland for 
promoting post-conflict political stability and integration. The state collapse of the former 
Somalia is often linked to the politicizing of clans and I will also examine what facilitated 
this process historically and try to say something about the importance of clan in today’s 
Somaliland. My thesis is based on a three-month fieldwork in Somaliland in 2001 where I 
did interviews with members of the elite and relevant and available literature on the Somali 
case in general and Somaliland in particular.  
The African political reality has proved much more complex than the development school of 
the sixties thought and to adopt western style democratic models has not brought progress 
and prosperity to the African state or people. The initial assumption that the implementation 
of democracy, a political system assumed to be able to create equity and development for all 
its citizens has been proven wrong. The understanding of the African state has had to be 
revised and admittedly it is much more complex than initially thought. The African states are 
more often than not a mix of different ethnic groups that do not necessarily make out a 
homogenous nation. Due to the consequent lack of economic development, social, economic 
and political structures often labelled as “traditional” continue to work and where the 
“traditional” meets the adopted “modern” new structures of democratic governing and 
various forms of market liberalizations new practices occurs. The meeting between 
structures indigenous to Africa and Western style ideas of state building and the capitalist 
world economy is not always peaceful. State collapse and the term “failed states” have 
unfortunately become well known terms in the post-Cold War era. In Africa south of Sahara 
the state has yet to fulfil the hopes present at independence; self-determination, 
independence and social, economic and political integration. The case of Somalia stands out 
as the state collapse seems to be final or at least of an almost indefinite character. Since the 
government of Somalia formally broke down in 1991 there has been no government 
structures that have incorporated the whole territory of the former Somalia and in parts of 
the country, namely the south the conflicts are still abundant with consequences that are 
almost impossible to comprehend to the rest of the world. For almost twenty years the 
population has had no formal system able to integrate people in a functioning state. The 
infrastructure in many parts of the country is destroyed and basic health care, schooling and 
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clean water is either not available or left for NGOs to provide. That is if the situation is 
stable enough for them to work within the country. People live in an environment where 
shifting alliances among rivalling groups make life unpredictable and where violence is a 
key ingredient.  
There are exceptions within the territory of the former Somalia. Somaliland, the former 
British Protectorate was able to oust the government forces from their territory in 1991 and 
as a result declared independence for the Republic of Somaliland. It took almost seven years 
to restore peace within Somaliland and it is both interesting in a more general context to 
look at what made the development possible from being part of a failed state with warring 
factions to a rather well defined political entity that has been able to re-establish law and 
order and create an environment for political, economic and social reconstruction and where 
the system seems to be able to contain conflicts in a non-violent way. It is important to keep 
in mind that every case of state failure is special in that it presents different historical, 
political, social and economic factors that have contributed to the disintegration in various 
ways. Anyhow, the Somaliland case is sure to have some characteristics that are identifiable 
in other cases and that could offer ideas and inspiration when it comes to possible strategies 
for conflict resolution in order to create stable environments for reconstruction and 
reintegration elsewhere. In a more limited context it is of course important to have some idea 
of the limitations and the possibilities that are present in the Somaliland case in order for the 
favourable stability to last. Last but not least, the Somaliland case is special in the sense that 
the reconciliation process that has facilitated the lasting stability was a local level strategy 
involving little assistance from the outside world. The local elites gathered and inspired by 
traditional patterns conflict resolution were able to over time settle internal conflicts and 
integrate all clan groups into a common system, the self proclaimed Republic of Somaliland. 
Many peace processes are international undertakings with neutral third parties and it is 
interesting to see how a local process performs and if local structures are able to somehow 
make the reconciliation process and the settlement more legitimate.   
My study is limited to the former British Protectorate, Somaliland. This thesis will not deal 
with the political developments in the rest of what I choose to call the former Somalia. I will 
only deal with the former Somalia in order to establish the historical developments that lead 
to the state collapse and in order to identify political processes over time that seems to have 
a significant role inside of today’s Somaliland. I would like to point out that the study is 
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relevant for the post-conflict period in general from 1997 up to 2001 when I did my 
fieldwork. There has been a transition towards more democratic political structures with the 
forming of political parties and several democratic elections have been held after the time of 
my study. My thesis does not take these developments into consideration. I hope that the 
reader will keep in mind that this thesis is not a part of a political debate of whether 
Somaliland in the future should be a part of Somalia if peace is successfully restored and a 
national government that has support from the population comes in place. My treating of 
Somaliland as a state rests on the fact that it has declared independence and has built up a 
structure that no doubt consists of common building blocks for states and they are to a 
considerable degree able to function as a formal state (Schoiswohl 2004).   
My research questions are as follows: 
1) What political strategies led to the disintegration of the Somali state in the early 90s? 
2) In what way are the political strategies of the Somaliland elite promoting stability 
and political integration? 
 
The first research question aims at describing historically politics of integration and 
disintegration in a Somali context. The political formations and strategies in Somaliland do 
not exist in a vacuum but should be traced backward in history. They consist of elements 
that pre-date the colonization of the Somalis in the late 1800s, the colonial experience and 
the subsequent post-independent experience with ten years of democratic elections and the 
experiment with scientific socialism that gradually became a repressive regime that finally 
collapsed after thirty years of independence.  What is important to have in mind is that 
external and internal forces contributed to the development towards disintegration. When 
trying to answer this question it is important to look at external input but most important, to 
look at how local structures developed and responded to this input. It is common to look 
upon the African state as a passive recipient of both political and economic impulses but the 
African states are not first and foremost structured by external forces but these act together 
with conscious and intended strategies locally that together make up the political fabric of 
the African state. 
In Somalia there are two factors in particular that I would like the reader to keep in mind 
One is the Somalis social structure of clan and the second the fact that the Somalis inhabit a 
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larger area than the former Somalia and have been seen as a homogenous group or rather a 
nation without a state (Laitin 1987).  
The Somalis organize in clans that trace their descent back to the prophet Mohamed. This 
way of organizing themselves has been crucial in order to survive as pastoralists in a scarce 
environment. There are two major pastoral clans and one clan mainly occupied in 
agriculture. Both are divided into further sub-clans. The different clans are possible to 
separate form each other and on the supra-clan level it is possible to place them 
geographically. Clans do overlap in which areas they occupy on both supra- and intra-clan 
levels which means that they have overlapping economic interest. The social, political and 
economic fabric of the Somalis is structured around this patrilinear system of decent creating 
flexible but predictable structures of interaction on all levels in order to make co-existence 
possible. It is this clan structure that has made some commentators call the conflict ethnic. It 
is probably not right to call it ethnic in a strict sense but if one sees ethnic conflicts as 
basically competition over resources by groups that are defined and possible to separate then 
the Somali conflict matches this description to quite some extent. This structure of clan thus 
becomes a possible network to mobilize and my analyses will show the particular form it 
took in Somalia. 
The Horn of Africa is inhabited by different ethnic groups and the Somalis are one of them. 
Somalia at independence was assumed to be one of the few African states that were 
inhabited by one ethnic group sharing a common language; Somali, a common religion; 
Islam and a common culture; the pastoral. The ethnic realities of the Somalis are more 
complex than that but it is possible to say that this conception of the Somalis as an ethnic 
nation has been embraced by the Somalis them self. This idea of all Somalis being one 
nation and they should be joined in one state has had implications for political strategies 
since before independence since in fact not all Somalis reside within Somalia.  
My second research question aims at finding out if the transitional system wiht indirect 
representation of clans in a democratic model is producing stability and why. I have chosen 
to look at the elite and how the political strategies they choose within the constitutional set-
up might encourage or discourage integration horizontally and vertically. My analysis will 
look upon how the legislative and the executive relate to each other and also how the two 
chambers of the legislative relate to each other by letting the members of these to branches 
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of government describe and explain their own strategies and say something about how they 
perceive the other’s strategies. Hopefully this will say something about the accountability 
between the branches. Strategies are seen as actively pursuing certain policies. In addition I 
have looked at what might be called passive strategies, the fact that certain policies are 
wanted but not carried out or seen as not satisfactorily carried out and interpreted as 
intentional or are in fact intentional. This should say if the system produces trust between the 
different groups and if it is predictable and thus promoting stability and horizontal 
integration on the elite level.  
Next I look at how the system is perceived from below and say something about the meaning 
of clan in society and in politics in Somaliland. Clan is the basis for representation in the 
system and how well does the political system integrate civil society, the clans in this case 
and in what way? Does the system that is set up actually facilitate participation from below? 
Has the relationship between state and society changed after the state collapse and in what 
way? The approach will be the same, I look at how people who do not hold positions in the 
system see the State’s performance and if there seems to be integrating strategies present or 
not. 
In the next chapter I will elaborate on two different theories that say something about the 
logic of politics in development countries in general and elite strategies in Africa in 
particular. The first theory will be focusing on patrimonial networks of distribution. 
Secondly I will look at Bayart’s theory of reciprocal integration of elites and the “politics of 
the belly”. I will also outline a political theory of elite accommodation and consensus, 
Lijphart’s consociational theory which has been used when analyzing politics of 
accommodation and power sharing in South Africa. These three combined will hopefully 
give insight into how there are both forces of integration and disintegration at work at the 
same time. In the next chapter I will outline the choice of method with an ethnographic 
approach that places me as a researcher in my research project. The first chapter of the 
analysis will look at the historical context the Somaliland state has emerged in putting 
emphasis on both internal, national, regional and international factors over time that in sum 
created the political strategies that led up to the collapse of Somalia and the Somaliland 
declaration of independence. I will also outline the formal set-up of the transitional system 
as it is the political structure that the elite strategies are structured around. The second 
chapter of the analysis will look at to what degree elite strategies in Somaliland facilitate 
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horizontal integration in the sate apparatus and vertical integration between the state and 
civil society by using the clan system as a building block towards more democratic state 
formations. This will be done by looking at how the elite describe their own function in the 
system, their perception of accountability between branches and how they describe their 
relationship with other branches of government. The main findings being that there is 
considerable integration horizontally within the elite whereas the state/civil society 
integration is still hampered by clientelistic relationships due to lack of economic 
development.  
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Theory 
The aim of this chapter is to establish a conceptual framework for the analysis. The first two 
theories are used in order to say something about vertical integration of elite/society and the 
second about horizontal integration within the elite. Clapham’s view is admittedly a bit old 
fashioned in that the African state is seen as a recipient of impulses and dependent whereas 
Bayart has more focus on local responses to external input and the historicity of every 
African state. The third theory is a democratic theory of consociationalism which seeks to 
accommodate different elite segments. 
Third World Politics 
In his book ”Third World Politics”, Clapham’s (1985)  aim is to describe politics in third 
world countries. His thesis is that the most important difference between western politics and 
third world politics are the context they take place in. The differences are not possible to pin 
on a particular nature of people and politicians in the third world countries. Third world 
countries share three similar characteristics that constitute the context that third world 
politics are played out in. His first point is the peripheral character of these economies. For 
the greater part they are primary export producers. The big industrial economies of the West 
created the economic system of capitalism. They are in control of the most advanced 
technology and thereby are able to benefit more from the economic system. Second he also 
says that the third world is also peripheral in a social and culturally sense. The culture and 
languages of the West and in particular European countries have been imposed on third 
world countries and in several cases replace for instance the indigenous languages. His third 
characteristic of these countries is the fact that they often constitute artificial territories in the 
sense that the political territories did not arise from the people they governed. 
His major point is that the third world per se was created by external forces and their ability 
to make free choices are only to the degree that they can chose different strategies to react to 
the externally imposed circumstances. He does on the other hand admit that the relationship 
of dominance and dependence did change after independence so that one also has to speak of 
an interaction between external and internal forces. The political systems before colonialism 
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and the introduction of the capitalist economy were much too diverse to make them possible 
to compare. Today the third world states are not formally linked to their colonial powers. 
Still, Clapham (1985) says that the state still has that elevated quality about it and those 
within see themselves at superior. At the same time those who are ruled see the state as an 
imposed structure that they have to accept and if possible exploit. This in turn makes the 
state in the third world the primary arena for political activity. 
Different modes of colonial rule shaped the independent states differently. The French had 
assimilation as a major goal while the British ruled by indirect rule. One used already 
existing structures of power or reinvented old ones that had already disappeared. This was 
cheap but also caused anti-colonial movements to arise much earlier in British colonies. 
Clapham says in his book that the view of the state in third world is that those who rule the 
state see themselves as superiors and thus not as servants of the population they are set to 
administer the state for. The ruled see the state as imposed on them rather than an elected 
structure constituted by the people. They have to accept and preferably try to take advantage 
of the sate is also a structure of control. Its power radiates from the capital and regional 
governors, the police forces, the courts and the army are part of this power grid. Second and 
just as important features are the agencies that manage the state’s economy. He says that the 
third world state in large lack developmental forces within and depends on being able to 
exploit the economy’s integration into the world economy.  The third world state has been 
unable to develop a hierarchical system of control because the state apparatus is so easily 
permeated by society. According to Clapham the colonial state did not have the same 
problem because of its foreign embededness and the fact that they were responsible towards 
themselves and not the general population. Only on the lowest levels was it possible to try to 
influence politics. These things combined make the state the main arena for politics to play 
out.  
Clapham further says that this gives a lack of shared common goals and values between state 
and society which again is the source of what he calls political fragility. This is the weakness 
of legitimacy and legitimacy is a society’s commitment to a set of given governmental 
institutions which allows for the election of leaders and to sustain them. The competition 
that one sees around the third world state reflects this lack of public values acceptable to 
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society and therefore possible to enforce. What makes the third world state survive is the fact 
that there are domestic and external interests that gain from its existence. 
 
Neopatrimonialism. 
Clapham uses Weber’s rational-legal basis for legitimacy as the starting point of his analyses 
of the working of the third world state. Legitimacy is the existence of widely acceptable 
goals within the public and an acceptable system to achieve these goals. The separation of 
public and private roles in the exercise of one’s office is crucial in order for a modern state 
to work. The ability to maintain a constitution is according to Clapham a good measure of 
legitimacy. In third world states the separation of public office and private affairs totally 
lacks and the constitutions are more often than not changed to suit the government in power 
and to regulate competition within the elite. Clapham goes further and says that the authority 
type of the third world countries is best described in terms of a Weberian patrimonialism. 
Power is subscribed to person and not position. The key to understanding the actor is to 
realize that who you exercise your power on behalf of is more important than what powers 
that are ascribed to you. Your position is defined by who your clients are and vice versa who 
your patron is. The system hinges on loyalty which in many cases translates into kinship. 
Staying loyal to one’s kin is considered a desirable social value. Clapham says that a typical 
way of managing the powers that is ascribed to the position one holds is to intervene in any 
matter one is entitled to whether necessary or not in order to demonstrate the personal 
character of the relationship between the patron and his subordinate clients. Humans 
naturally tend to not separate private and public and in Third world countries this form has 
survived from precolonial forms.  
 
Corruption 
Corruption where one uses a public position to achieve private goals is one of the primary 
characteristics of such a neo patrimonial system. Clapham explains this by the fact that 
precolonial values are practiced in a modern political system. They translate into bribery or 
extortion by. The giving of a gift makes bribery from below while the dominant class 
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extracts surplus by extortion from above. Due to the lack of liberal democracy weakness of 
accountability by the rulers is a dominant structural feature. Moving up socially through 
education, physically moving into a better neighborhood, getting a better job or position and 
a higher pay creates a distance between the patrons and the clients.  
The state provides institutionalized inequality of power. The system is highly hierarchical 
and is not checked by the powers that are typically produces by capitalism and private 
property. Since the system has few control mechanism even the lowest ranking officials are 
using their power to enrich themselves. Clapham says that the highly common conception 
among state employees at all levels that they are poorly paid, whether it is the reality or not 
leads them to use their power to gain economic benefits that enhance their position. The link 
to the international society is particularly beneficial to the elite. Officials have material gains 
from every import license and government contract that is given and external support is 
more often than not partly responsible for sustaining weak and vulnerable political regimes. 
 
Patron and Clients 
In order to stay in power it is crucial to have support from a larger segment of the 
population. This is achieved by the patron providing security for the client in return for 
support. The protection takes on many forms. The patron may give the client physical 
protection or he can provide land or development assistance. In return the client can vote for 
his patron, work or provide information amongst others. This kind of system is most 
common in societies with sharp class divisions but without any one coherent enough to act 
on their own. Clapham says that agrarian communities are the most common to practice this 
type of unequal but necessary exchange.  
The neopatrimonial state is an equally appropriate arena for such structures. The main 
inequality in this arena is the difference between those who control or are able to control the 
state and those who are not. The same inequality exists within the system too based on 
hierarchical differences. In this setting a network right down to the grassroots level is created 
for distribution of benefits in order to create support. The system works as to make the local 
leaders with authority to the local communities benefit from creating support to patrons in 
the top echelon of the structure. For support from the lowest level local leaders might get a 
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higher position, their area might be granted funding for improving infrastructure or other 
development assistance. These clientelistic networks take on many forms. In Jamaica the 
unions play such a role and in Senegal the religious brotherhoods, and most often Somalia is 
analyzed through their ethnic affiliations; the clan. The consequence of clientelism is the 
upholding of the unequal power relations between the elite and the rest of the population. It 
is an effective system to prevent the lowest class to become strong enough to act on its own 
in order to strengthen common rights and needs. Clapham believes that clientelism will 
persist as long as people are vulnerable to political and economical circumstances since its 
particular structure seems to offer both patron and client the hope of thing getting better. For 
clients to pursue their goals through more objective mechanisms economic development that 
reduces their vulnerability has to take place. In some extreme cases the fact that a group falls 
totally out of the system and has nothing to loose can produce more revolutionary strategies 
from the clients. 
Bayart’s approach: The need for historicism. 
Bayart (1993) points out that a major problem with the research and writing done by the 
social science on African politics has been that Africa’s historicity has not been 
acknowledged until recently. In most cases the African polities have been seen as the passive 
receivers of input from the Western world that has shaped their political strategies 
exclusively. They are the dependant of a world economy that favors the advanced capitalist 
economies and which leave the poor countries with few real options in forming their own 
policies. There has also been given little attention to African political culture before 
colonization. The colonization process and eventually decolonization has been seen as the 
single most shaping events on today’s political culture and structures in countries south of 
Sahara. The complexity of African polities has been ignored to a large extent and their 
strategies reduced to being deterministic and void of internal dynamics.  
He points particularly to the process of dependency and how African elites have been able to 
use their dependency on Western capital to obtain internally structured material aspirations. 
When going in to describe how politics and culture react to the influence from the West 
undue focus has been put on what the input has consisted of. Little attention has been given 
to the fact that any input is structured in different ways according to the receiving society 
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and its economic, cultural and political structure. Indigenous agents vigorously and 
consciously integrated and dismissed outside influence. Earlier writings have done the 
mistake of seeing African societies as passive recipients when they in fact shape and are in 
control of their internal environment and are important actors in shaping the outcome of their 
integration with the Western world. 
It is important to realize that Africa’s political history did not begin with colonization. 
African societies have been involved in various relationships both internally and externally 
that have had a deciding effect on how they have developed from long before colonization 
and towards the present. Bayart points specifically towards the fact that the internal social 
struggle on the continent has been a deciding force on how their unequal relationship with 
the rest of the world has developed. This social struggle goes back centuries. The major 
reason why central states did not develop until the last part of the twentieth century was the 
resistance of the dominant groups of being organized in a central state structure and their 
willingness to do what was necessary in order to protect their right to self determination and 
control over their productive forces. 
Bayart’s Hypothesis of Reciprocal Assimilation of Elites 
Bayart (1993) introduces three different scenarios in the pursuit of hegemony in Africa.  
Conservative modernization and social revolution represent the extreme counterparts. The 
former is when a dominant group stays in power the latter when the dominant group is 
removed from power by social revolution and a segment of the subordinate groups rise to 
power. The hypothesis of the reciprocal assimilation of elites is a third and less extreme 
scenario. This is the scenario Bayart focuses on as a motor of both stability and conflict and 
that I will further outline here.  
His claim is that around the continent there is an ongoing process of assimilating the elite 
segments of different ethnic and social groups into the state matrix (Bayart 1993). The goal 
is to create stable and lasting coalitions. Politically stable regimes are often characterized by 
this process of bringing different elite segments together in a process of accumulation. He 
suggests that the same process might as well be found in states that are ridden by crises. The 
process of reciprocal assimilation of elites may take place in heterogeneous settings. Even 
though the political systems and power structures vary from country to country it will be 
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possible to identify this process. Seemingly contradictory political systems will be able to 
produce the same scenario of reciprocal assimilation.  
There are two bases for reciprocal assimilation of elites; civil society and political society 
(Bayart 1993).  Civil society is understood in a Marxian sense to comprise of the family and 
the clan in a broad sense. In order to avoid the easy acceptance of difference occurring along 
the lines of linage and power as presented in terms of family he further says in accordance 
with Marx more precise definitions of civil society that it will not develop without a 
bourgeoisie.  
Within civil society Bayart (1993) identifies different arenas where such assimilation may 
occur. Funeral ceremonies are used to distinguish the deceased and his rank within society. 
They are social gatherings that officials in variously will attend and the links between the 
deceased and powerful segments of society are acknowledged and thereby renewed and 
sometimes established. Marriage is another arena where such fusion of elites takes place. 
Unions are made that create new coalitions geographically, ethnically and socially. 
Institutions of higher education have also played the same role as have more mystic societies 
like free masonry and Islamic brotherhoods. Within the business world similar processes 
take place where multifunctional alliances are made and sustained through various practices. 
Material relations between individuals are thus shaped in a specific way according to Bayart 
in order to pursue hegemony and facilitate accumulation.  
Political society offers further arenas for the reciprocal assimilation of elites. Civil society 
and political society intersect through various institutions and practices and the fact that the 
division between the two is often blurred in African societies makes it impossible to separate 
and treat them as two different arenas. Civil society acts within political society through 
various institutions like trade unions, parliament and political parties.  
The party is by Bayart (1993) identified as on of the five practices that contributes and 
facilitates the creation and structuring of a dominant class. Political parties developed 
alongside colonialism and have been a major arena for horizontal integration of the elite 
segments.  It is quite common for traditional leaders to be represented in the party. There 
seems to be little contradiction between the multiparty system and the single party system. 
The African single party system is characterized to a great extent by a culture of conflict but 
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also of negotiation. There is continuously an ongoing process of negotiating between patron 
and client, and elites that are separated geographically, economically or socially. 
Secondly Bayart (1993) points to elections as crucial in the process of bringing the elites 
together. Electoral rules seem to favor the groups that are pursuing hegemony, those who 
own land and are wealthy or have a favorable position due to inherited position or age. Other 
groups are kept out of the process through various repressive means and legal regulations. 
Both the processes of confrontation and consensus building, however contradictory they 
seem, bring together powerful echelons of society.   
 The real melting pot though seems to be the bureaucracy where the administration and army 
seems to cause a true social and geographical mixture of people to organize around common 
principles of organization, consumption and technology (Bayart 1993). The bureaucracy is a 
true child of colonialism and has not lost its significance and power after independence. In 
variously the bureaucracy is used to integrate more traditional elites, to invite segments of 
the elite that have been shut out for a period to join the dominant elite and it has a prime role 
in negotiating with elites on the local level. This is also where the recruitment for offices 
takes place and it also serves as a buffer in the sense that a position in the bureaucracy often 
is used to keep conflict from arising due to the falling position of certain groups. Instead of 
pushing them out and provoke a counter mobilization of that particular elite segment they 
can be kept inside of the system yet in a less favorable position through the bureaucracy. 
By chieftaincy Bayart (1993) refers to power positions that were both created by colonialism 
and those that preceded it. The position is acquired trough individual political or economic 
performance Some are based on lineage as often is the case with colonial chieftaincy and 
some are results of a rotational system where changes are brought about through conflict. A 
very common practice is that those who already have a so called “traditional” position also 
hold positions in the bureaucracy, political offices or are businessmen or other types of 
professionals. If you belong to either group it is common to try to enter the other, get a 
traditional title or enter political life or business. 
The formulation of a political ideology of the dominant group further enhances the 
reciprocal assimilation of elites. It is important that the ideology embraces the heterogeneity 
of the country and is able to explain just about anything. Though this might make it 
practically void of actual and realistic descriptions of conditions it serves as a uniting factor. 
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In a linguistic term most countries in Africa chose to use the administrational language of 
the colonial powers as the state language in order to demonstrate that one has a focus on 
unity and cooperation versus the segmentary tendencies of the past. In Tanzania Swahili has 
the same function even though it is an African language. In the case of Somalia Bayart says 
that cultural homogeneity explains the use of Somali. Still Italian and English have been 
important languages in an administrative sense and still are. What is important to understand 
is that the difference between the scholarly language and the popular language is a source of 
power to the elite. 
Bayart’s (1993) main conclusion is then that it is impossible to claim as much literature do 
that there is one dominant class which is the tenant of the postcolonial state but rather that 
the state is an instrument in the hands of a class in formation. The reciprocal assimilation of 
the elite works toward the creation of a dominant class but he finds no evidence that such a 
class exists today. The process is in different stages in different countries due to quite 
different historical conditions. The lack of historicism makes it difficult to evaluate this 
emerging class’ power to reproduce itself and how it affects the social and economic 
situation of society. The assimilation of elites and pursuit of hegemony predates the 
atomization of the African continent by the West. 
At the same time the forces of divergence seems to be as much a part of the creation of a 
dominant class as a hinder. No where in Africa is it possible according to Bayart to observe a 
dominant class defined in the tradition of Marx: A class aware of itself that thinks of itself 
and sees itself as a unity and acts as such. Everywhere you look the class that controls the 
sate can not be seen as a unity but the sum of individual strategies. In order to clarify Bayart 
uses Giddens insistence on a contextual definition of social stratification where both 
mechanisms of creation and dissolution of social groups are equally important. 
  
A postcolonial historical bloc 
In order to explain the somewhat complexity of this process which is both a process of 
integration and divergence Bayart turns to Gramsci’s concepts of passive revolution and 
historic bloc in order to make the multi dimensional meaning of the quest for hegemony 
apparent. 
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In Africa “passive revolution” refers to the educated elites rise to power and seizure of state 
power and their refusal to enhance and radicalize the popular movements against 
colonialism. It also describes how the educated group has reached an agreement with the 
former elite in power and thereby reproduced the process on a larger scale (p 181). This 
makes the theories of Sklar and Balandier more evident, that today’s inequality in Africa is 
the result of post-colonial processes and it facilitates a comparison with other theories of 
authoritarianism in various continents where the exact same cooperation between groups has 
been vital in state building through passive revolution. Instead of allying themselves with the 
lower social echelons the intellectuals have allied themselves with the ruling elite. The post 
colonial state has made an effort in order to suffocate social movements and make them 
impotent. By cooptation either by force or voluntarily the existing elite have managed to 
absorb any element that could threaten their monopoly to power, leaders of trade unions, 
workers and peasant movements have been integrated in the state apparatus and thus 
prevented from building up radicalized counter movements with basis in the people. In the 
urban areas the demolition of illegal squatter settlements also testifies to the states lack of 
will to support and accept radicalization on the grass root level. Budding leadership of the 
small men’s organizations are destroyed and land rights are manipulated. The alternative 
strategy of assimilation is striking deals with the leadership of potentially disruptive 
organization in the state’s point of view that does not bring anything to the state other than 
absence of open conflict. The quite common restrictions on the freedom of association that 
are found in almost every country south of Sahara is another effective way of keeping the 
intellectuals from allying themselves with subordinate social groups. There are also attempts 
to incorporate religious intellectuals into the state structure but this is much harder to 
control. 
Bayart says that by using the concept of a historic postcolonial bloc it is possible to avoid 
describing the state along ethnic or regional divisions as has been common up to now. It 
identifies the alliances that the intellectuals have formed over the last century, the fusion of 
elites and it enables us to get rid of the opposition that former studies have seen between 
ethnic explanations, dependency and class and instead a synthesis becomes apparent. In 
Africa today there probably is not one historic bloc or one dominant established class but 
using the term of “passive revolution” and the “quest for hegemony” it is possible to say that 
these processes have local, regional and international ramification and there is a movement 
towards one historic bloc and not many regional. The realization of the postcolonial historic 
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bloc differs from country to country as does the degree of articulation with the western 
world, the type of articulation and the consequences of this articulation. Most important it is 
not possible to stop at the national level when applying his theory because the assimilation 
of elite takes place on a pan African level and they again are integrating with the western 
world. 
The Sub-Saharan countries’ articulation with the western world does not produce uniform 
regimes. Different countries are integrated to various degrees; some are marginalized in 
terms of the historic bloc while others have withdrawn. Multinational organizations greatest 
achievement is the creation of a political domain rather than their economic performance. 
The forming of the postcolonial bloc also gravitates towards certain regions with permanent 
fluctuation that are decisive in individual countries’ reproduction of inequality. In order to 
understand this production of inequality it is necessary to have knowledge of the sates’ 
articulation regionally and their history of articulation with the West, the Arab world and the 
Asian Diaspora which all have created different practices over the continent, is necessary. 
 
Lijphart’s consociational democracy 
Liphart’s consociational theory was first formulated in the late sixties. His inspiration was 
amongst others an analysis by Lewis who wrote about politics in West-Africa. A second 
early contributor to the writings on consociational systems was a Nigerian political scientist, 
Claude Ake in his book: ”The theory of political integration” in 1967. None of the books 
uses the term consociationalism but both describe consociational political structures and 
strategies. After Lijphart took into use the term consociationalism which was originally used 
by Althusius, the theory was mainly applied to analyzing European countries like Belgium, 
The Netherlands and Switzerland. The main empirical evidence of consociationalism is 
according to Lijphart Lebanon and Malaysia where indigenous political leaders developed 
the system without any external Western influence.  As apartheid was drawing towards an 
end in the eighties Lijphart himself formulated his last version of his power-sharing theory 
of consociationalism related to the South-African political realities. His book: “Power-
Sharing in South-Africa” (1985) must be seen as an attempt to analyze how different 
democratic models would work in the South-African reality. He also tries to answer to the 
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critiques on consociationalism and to show what makes consociationalism a viable political 
system for South-Africa. I will outline his prescription for a consociational democracy in 
South Africa and also look at some of the criticism that has been launched against 
consociational theory and dealt with by the author in this book. 
In order to define a society as pluralistic Lijphart has listed certain criterions in order to say 
something about in which instances the theory can be useful. Societal pluralism is present if  
it is possible to define the different segments in society clearly. The segments must also be 
possible to define accurately in numbers.  Social, economic and political organization should 
also coincide with segmental boundaries. Last but not least, the segment should receive the 
stable electoral support from their own segment. If all these characteristics are present in a 
society Lijphart defines it as pluralistic. His definition of democracy is from Robert A. Dahl 
and equals his term polyarchy. According to Dahl (1977) polyarchy are regimes that are 
highly inclusive and open to public contestation. Dahl takes democracy to be a regime that is 
responsive to the preferences of all its citizens and where everybody are seen as political 
equals and depends on that all citizens have unimpaired opportunities. The citizens must be 
able to formulate their preferences, to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and 
the government both through individual and collective action and their preferences should be 
weighed equally in the conduct of the government with no discrimination because of the 
content or source of the preference (p. 2). He says that very few if any system exist that can 
be truly called a democracy and his polyarchy is a system close to democracy.   
In his book Lijphart (1985) comes with eight optimal consociational guidelines for South-
Africa and I will use these as they can be seen as his final formulation of his theory on 
consociational democracy. First there should be absolute freedom of association, individual 
freedom of affiliation and free competition among groups and parties (p 81). In this way 
Lijphart believes that the segments will emerge spontaneously and not be predetermined. 
Thus it should be possible to avoid a predetermined definition of the segments as racial, 
ethnic or cultural biased. Second, proportional legislative elections should be used on all 
levels. Third, at all levels the executive should be proportionally constituted collegial bodies, 
elected or appointed. Fourth, also the civil service, including the police, the armed forces 
and the judiciary should be guided by proportionality when appointing officials. Fifth, group 
autonomy should be the result of a combination of territorial and corporate federalism. Sixth, 
the boundaries of a territorial federation should be drawn as to create economically viable 
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and administrational effective entities with relatively homogenous populations. These states 
should also have consociational constitutions since complete homogeneity seems difficult to 
obtain. Seventh, Cultural and educational autonomy should be obtained through corporate 
federalism. The organization might be either private or public. Eight and last, a minority 
veto should be available to even the smaller groups and should consist of an absolute veto on 
fundamental issues, defined as cultural by Lijphart and a suspensive veto on non-
fundamental issues. These are by Lijphart seen as the optimal conditions but not the only 
feasible. 
Criticism of the consociational theory has been many-fold and Lijphart himself has 
categorized it into six categories. I will look into a few of them as they seen to have some 
interesting reservations towards a consociational theory that are necessary to keep in mind 
when analyzing countries in the lower economic income stratums in the world. 
The first category challenges that consociationalism is likely to lead to durable pace and 
democracy. It claims that the relationship between democracy and stability in countries that 
are considered consociational are either spurious or the causality should be reversed, where 
there is democracy consociationalism can follow and not the opposite. This strand of 
criticism seems to think that consociational system are prone to run into certain problems 
that is going to make them unsuccessful. Switzerland which is considered by Lijphart to 
have a consociational political system of separation into cantons, the proportional 
representation on both national and cantonal level and their initiative and referendum 
initiative. The disagreement seems to be related to which function the different elements can 
have. The referendum is by critics seen to be a way of letting the majority impose their 
solution on the minority. Lijphart sees the referendum as a tool that makes most parties 
consider compromise in order to avoid that groups with enough power can ask for a 
referendum, a costly process. This means that it can function as a minority veto and a 
consociational feature of the Swiss system. Lebanon’s consociational rule that evidently 
failed after several decades has also been seen as an example of the failure of 
consociationalism. Lijphart points to the fact that in order for a consociational rule to work it 
has to change with society. In Lebanon the Christian majority slowly became a Moslem 
majority without the fixed ratio for parliament giving the Christians a majority of the seats 
being changed even though the Moslems over time had become the majority. To some critics 
this shows the inability of consociational system to adapt to the changing circumstances 
 23
while to Lijphart this merely tells that it is necessary for a consociational system to improve 
over time and that replacing it might not be the best solution given that it in many cases is 
the only feasible alternative in order to achieve some form of democratic system. Another 
point of Lijphart’s is that the conflicts of Lebanon are not as much internal conflicts as they 
are regional, inter-Arab conflicts projected on internal divisions. This I think actually is a 
more serious part of the criticism against consociationalism in plural societies. This suggests 
that it is actually necessary to take into account what tension material that is available in the 
region and possible to project down on a national level. It would be naive to say that it is 
possible to make a divide between “ordinary international conflicts” as Lijphart calls them 
and internal conflicts if the segments of the consociational system are not restricted to being 
inside the consociational entity. This means that one of the factors that one has to consider is 
the likelihood of conflicts becoming international with basis in internal division since this 
will cause extra strain on a system if they are realized. 
Some have also questioned whether a consociational system can work for ethnic conflicts or 
is better suited for religious or class conflicts. In the latter the will to make compromise is 
greater since they are more organized and willing to follow their leader while in ethnically 
segmented societies there is no need for organization in order to rebel against the system as 
long as their segment is distinguishable. Organized groups tend to differ on how to run the 
country while ethnic conflicts tend to be deeper and question the actual political entity. 
Lijphart seems to be of the opposite opinion. Ethnic segments organize in much the same 
way as other groups. Their differences are easier to reach compromise over since they are 
not based in ideological and religious differences which he tends to believe are more 
difficult to work around. Marxists have launched the same criticism, believing that 
ideological and class conflicts are deeper and more challenging than what they call 
superficial ethnic and cultural conflicts. They also claim that consociationalism does not 
consider class conflict and thereby is unable to deal with that type of conflict. Class conflict 
will not be promoted or articulated. Lijphart himself agrees to the fact that if the segments 
are more or less equal in socioeconomic terms the conditions for consociationalism are more 
favorable. He also believes that the countries that have practiced consociationalism have 
been just as successful in dealing with evening out the socioeconomic differences in their 
society. 
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The system is also believed to be more inefficient than others. The minority veto may 
hamper political decision processes and segmental autonomy might lead to unnecessary 
duplication of different governmental units and other facilities like schools. Lijphart argues 
that in the long perspective the costs are lower because the system in the long run avoids 
creating more tension on behalf of the minority groups that are bound to be overlooked in a 
majoritarian system. Still this is a problem that should be taken serious in the event that a 
consociational system is adapted in a poor country. The ability to provide the institutional 
infrastructure that a consociational system needs in order to function and being able to have 
a long term outlook on the effect this system should have might be impossible for countries 
that are deeply divided by conflict. It will be important to ask the question how long the 
public will accept that a very large proportion of the states income will go to administration 
rather than improving for instances public services like health care and fresh water.    
A second strand of criticism claims that it is wrong to claim that majoritarian rule can not 
succeed in plural society. Lijphart's argument is that there is nothing to suggest that this is 
impossible but a consociational system has a better chance of success in a plural society. 
Very often it is the only alternative as majoritarian rule is not seen as an option. 
Consociationalism has the strength of the segments being equal as opposed to a system 
where “control” is used. This is a situation where a superior power of a dominant segment 
mobilizes in order to control the possibility for other segments to act politically and their 
opportunities. Lijphart argues that this rarely can be seen as a democratic system and that a 
consociational system is more democratic. Others have argued that there are no evidence to 
support that consociational democracies do better in plural societies in the third world than 
any other type of democracy. Lijphart seems to have a different opinion and points to that 
only India seems to be a successful majoritarian democracy but it does have consociational 
features and can not be seen as a case that proves a majoritarian systems ability to absorb 
conflict and refute the usefulness of systems built on consociational principles. 
The third type of criticism asks whether consociationalism is a cause or and effect in plural 
societies. It is stated that some of the consociational systems are not really plural societies, 
that the cleavages and segmentation of some consociational systems have been deepened and 
enhanced as a result of the consociational features of the system. Some of the cases that 
Lijphart consider consociational systems like the Swiss and the Austrian are by others not 
seen as plural societies and it is therefore hard to argue that consociationalism is the cause of 
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their political stability. Another attack on consociational theory is the claim that some 
leaders promote pluralism and consociationalism in order to secure their own position by 
institutionalizing the problems of society and partially solving some of the problems. In this 
way a continuous need for leadership is created and the system is perceived as somewhat 
efficient. The Marxist take on this is that the cleavages are created and maintained by the 
politicians in order to mask class and suppress class conflict. Lijphart argues that it would be 
more beneficiary to leaders who wanted to stay in power to encourage segmentation and 
antagonism than to actually work out compromises with the competing segments. Still this is 
a point that should be kept in mind because very few systems are as transparent as desired 
and in a consociational system this lack of transparency would very much build up under the 
conception of politicians being in the system for spoils rather than representing their group 
and working for equal opportunities and development for all the parties represented. The 
class issue is by Lijphart answered by saying that the segments should be more rather than 
less homogenous in socioeconomic terms in a consociational system. Further he believes 
that this type of criticism to a large extent underestimates the importance and strength of 
segmental divisions. Class cleavages are certainly important but so are other cleavages and 
they have to be taken seriously. (Lijphart sees them as facts and not figments of the elite's 
imagination, unlike “imagined communities”) 
Consociational systems at work have been criticized for not being democratic at all. The 
main issue seems to be that countries that are seen as consociational by Lijphart to a large 
degree are seen as having quite closed and secretive decision processes. Another issue is that 
this kind of elite democracy where the elite control the electoral lists is easily manipulated. 
Both arguments are interesting but none the less a problem of majoritarian democracies as 
well. Still it is important to consider if in a consociational democracy these two elements are 
more easily manipulated than in others democratic systems. It is certainly not correct to 
imply that a consociational system automatically is less democratic. 
Lijphart also sets up nine favorable conditions in order to set up a consociational system and 
maintain it. These are by him not seen as necessary or sufficient but merely conditions that 
facilitate a consociational system. By not claiming that they are necessary his critics react. 
Some think that in order for Lijphart’s conditions to be relevant they have to be necessary 
otherwise they are not likely to be conditions at all but that the relationship between these 
conditions and consociationalism is spurious. This is by far too strict standards for a theory 
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in the social science and is likely to disqualify more than Lijphart’s consociational theory as 
well 
The lack of a majority segment is one of Lijphart’s conditions. If there exists a segment that 
makes up the majority of the population it is less likely that that this segment will adhere to 
the rules of consociationalism but rather use majoritarian measures in order to influence 
decision making. The segments should also be relatively equal in numbers and the number of 
segments should be small. In addition the population should be small also. 
An external threat is seen as favorable in the sense that it can have a unifying effect on the 
different segments. It is therefore important that the threat is perceived the same by all the 
segments. Critics note that an external threat would increase the pressure on the system and 
possibly be a negative factor. Lijphart thinks that an overriding identity also is of importance 
as it makes the different segments have a share feeling of being a entity.  
Socioeconomic equality is another favorable condition. If there are segments that are 
significantly wealthier than others a consociational system might seem threatening to this 
particular group.   The challenges here are many. In for instance most countries south of the 
Sahara a wealthy elite is believed to find a system of accommodations threatening. In the 
cases where consociationalism is not seen as threatening the system still must have enough 
resources in order commit to a politics of redistribution. 
The last two conditions are that the segments should be geographically concentrated. This is 
because it makes it easier to establish segmental autonomy through federalism and 
decentralization. Last but not least there should be traditions for accommodation among the 
segments. 
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have outlined three theories that should contribute to understanding the 
dynamics of the Somaliland state’s effort to integrate all groups and segments of society in 
order to promote stability in particular but also the historical development toward collapse of 
Somalia in 1991. Clapham focuses on the patron/client relationship in a hierarchical 
structure and how the lack of economic development will keep these kinds of uneven 
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networks going since there is little other hope of improvement. He focuses on how power is 
subscribed to person and not position and how the link to the international society is so 
profitable to the elite that being in position becomes crucial. Bayart points out that the 
African state has been able to profit from its dependency and how this creates material 
aspirations locally. His major point is that there is an ongoing process of reciprocal 
assimilation of elites and that this process can have both integrating and disintegrating force. 
He talks of the ongoing formation of a historic postcolonial bloc that as a concept makes it 
possible to understand the fusion of elites in Africa without looking towards ethnic, regional 
and class explanations. Lijpart’s theory gives a prescription for power-sharing within elites 
representing identifiable groups within society. Representation of all groups and the 
possibility to exercise vetoes in order to protect the group’s interest are key ingredients. It is 
also favourable if the different segments are homogenous in socioeconomic terms and share 
some common idea of being an entity.  
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Method 
In this I have chosen to first say something about the researcher’s role in producing 
knowledge. I had an assumed advantage since I had family in the area and assumed 
knowledge and understanding of the field I wanted to do research in that was structured by 
these family ties. This has consequences for what you have access to of information but also 
how you interpret the data you collect. I further say something about how your contacts are 
important in structuring the access to the field and move on to describe my choice of 
method, the qualitative research interview and how they were carried out and discussing how 
me being married to a Somali might have had implications for my research. I then say 
something about using secondary literature and how it reflects different positions and can 
not be said to be neutral.  
Assumed insider or just another outsider? 
My initial interest in the case stemmed from the fact that  I was married to a Somali and in 
that way got a much more detailed and complex understanding of Somali culture, religion, 
politics and society than I had had before and than what was portrayed in media. It became 
natural to take advantage of the fact that I in that respect had a family there that could help 
me get started with my fieldwork and one also is under the assumption that as a part of the 
community through marriage one can get insight and access to the field in a different way 
than if one was totally on the outside.   
Being so personally involved in the culture and society that I went into makes it important to 
reflect over the consequences this has for my research (Hammersley and Atkinsom 1996). 
As a Somali family of the Diaspora the expectations to us as an economic unit were probably 
much higher and different from that of others. Because my husband had ties in the 
communities we moved around in it created an awkward situation of us not being entirely 
sure of what was expected of us in terms of contributing economically. We did in many 
ways support parts of his family but tried in general to keep a low profile, not hiring 
expensive cars and we chose to live in a predominantly Somali township. But no matter how 
Somali you are of origin you totally depend on those who stayed behind in order to make 
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your way around and this bond between them and you constitutes of expectations of giving 
back to the community in a material way. Doing research in this context did create some 
challenges because you always had to try to strike a balance between being a Somali with 
obligations of a more serious and long lasting character and being a foreigner and researcher. 
Being part of a Somali family made me quite aware of my appearance. I did in many more 
ways consider what was expected of me both in terms of behavior and dressing. The people 
you meet will always try to place you in some social context in order to relate to you. One 
way of making people relate to you more easily is to try to make your outer appearance fit 
in. The working identity that you create for yourself is supposed to enable you to use your 
skills and the knowledge you already have (Hammersley and Atkinson 1996). In my case 
that did not seem as much of an option as something I some how felt I had to do. During the 
whole stay I wore a veil. As a European it was not necessary for me to do so. Most foreign 
women I saw in Hargeysa wore western clothes and no one covered their heads. And either 
ways I stood out, in my Somali neighborhood but also among Westerners who automatically 
saw me as a white woman who had converted to Islam and were more cautious about taking 
contact. What became important was to signal my attachment to the community but at the 
same time not dress in a religious way as I am not a Muslim. I solved this by only wearing 
Somali dresses in thin cotton and never the more heavy clothed hijabs. I did experience 
some pressure from other women in the family to dress even more properly but it seemed 
that I most of the time got recognition for trying to respect local customs.  
The segregation between the sexes is very acute in Somali communities. Men and women 
dine separately and rarely stay in the same room socializing. Women are not expected to not 
communicate with men in public but there are definitely rules of conduct to observe. This I 
became quite aware of during my stay. As a female doing research in a predominantly male 
political community I did run into some obstacles. For one it seemed that my husband for 
instance was more aware of the fact that I was a woman in a man’s world. He would 
comment on me laughing out loud for instance in the company of men when doing 
interviews. He also seemed worried that I would take up too much time of the people I 
interviewed and would ask me to cut it short when we got close to an hour. The Somali 
culture is an oral culture and the conversation is a valued and time consuming part of every 
ones lives, especially men. In my case it became a liability that I was a Somali wife and that 
what was considered appropriate came into play more than it might have done otherwise. It 
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seemed interviews were cut short due to the fact that the Somali code of conduct applied 
more to me than it would have with any other Western woman. Men can talk for hours, 
women in the company of men is a different cup of tea. What at least seems to be the case is 
that you tend to let assumed expectations from your surroundings dictate what you choose to 
do and how you interpret the behavior of others and ultimately put limitations on your self in 
regard of what is acceptable and possible 
 
Getting access to the case 
In order to get the insight that I needed into Somali political life and institutions fieldwork 
seemed to be a natural choice of method. The former Somalia collapsed in the late 80s and in 
Somaliland that I wanted to study internal conflicts were frequent up to 1996. The 
consequence of this unstable situation was that there had been produced less academic 
literature in the conflict period than desired if one wanted to do a study of only secondary 
literature. The political system I wanted to look into was set up quite recently and in a 
transitional period and not very well documented. The lack of recognition internationally 
might also have contributed to the meager amount of literature that was produced on the 
subject. By going there I got the possibility to experience the phenomenon that I wanted to 
study and to gather the necessary information in order to try to answer my research 
questions. 
It can often be difficult to get access to the case that you want to study. This is a problem 
experienced both before entering the field and during fieldwork (Hammersley and Atkinson 
1996). Initially I had to make sure that it was possible to go to Somaliland without too much 
risk other than those you usually run into when going to countries in other climates and with 
less stable and predictable political and social systems than in the western world. By talking 
to members of the Somali community in Oslo and contacting family in the area I wanted to 
visit I was able to conclude that Somaliland had seen substantial improvement in security 
over the last few years, communication with surrounding states and the Gulf states were 
good and no particular risk was attached to going there as a foreigner. The first condition for 
my research project was fulfilled. 
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Who you get to interview will often be directed just as much by the contacts you use as your 
own preferences (Hammersley and Atkinson 1996). My husband's brother introduced me to 
my main contact “Abdi”. He knew him as a teacher of Arabic a few years back. He helped 
me because he found my project interesting and probably because he was asked by a good 
friend; my brother in law. He was either making interview appointments for me or contacted 
others that could do it. There is always a danger that one gets access to a certain type of 
people holding particular political views when you access the field through one door keeper. 
“Abdi” was a learned Muslim that had studied the Quran for years. He had worked as a 
schoolteacher for years. When we were there he worked as an engineer in one of the biggest 
providers of bank and telecommunication services in Somaliland and the former Somalia. He 
was a key employee, responsible for the installation of the cell phone network in the region 
and he also worked with computer hard and soft ware at the main office in Hargeysa. In the 
early nineties he was active in a radical Islamic group. As most Somalis that stayed in the 
country during the civil wars he had experienced life in the refugee camps in Ethiopia 
several times. Through him and his network of friends, colleagues and business associates 
we got in touch with a broad specter of people ranging from people loyal to government 
politics through opposition politicians to Islamic “puritans”. He seemed to be pro-
Somaliland but still very tuned into the conflict material that was present in the public and 
because of this he did put me in contact with people that would be able to give me 
descriptions of the workings of the political community along lines that coincided with 
oppositional groups to the government.  
It is easy to become trapped in your initial assumption of what is possible to achieve and 
who will be available to you (Hammersley and Atkinson 1996). As I got down there I 
realized during the first few weeks that all groups were represented in the system, even the 
groups that are not considered Somali and that are outside the Somali’s social structure of 
clan. The tensions in the system were by no means exclusively defined by struggle between 
groups that lacked representation and thereby influence. My main contact also seemed able 
to put me in touch with people that I had not planned to talk to initially. I was e.g. able to 
interview high officials appointed by the president. Among these were mayors of major 
towns and ministers of the sitting government. Because of this my strategy changed after 
arrival from wanting to talk to only elected representatives to try to talk to as many different 
people as possible, different in the meaning of clan, position and outlook on the political 
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system. From thinking that I should try to get a representative sample I chose to pursue a 
strategy of using key informants and not let clan be the deciding factor. I still tried to make 
sure that the respondents that I interviewed were from several different major clans so that it 
would be possible to recognize differences in strategy between the different groups if there 
were any.  
The only groups that I did not pursue to interview were those considered to be non-Somalis 
like the Midgan, Jibir and Tuumale. My intent was to study the formal system and by 
excluding these groups that are minorities and not integrated in the system in the same way 
as Somali clans I lost some of the complexity of Somali politics, because as the system 
matures it will indeed be important to see how the system deals with this kind of caste 
segmentation that actually exists inside of Somali communities.  
Another group that fell outside of my study was women which are more than half the 
population in Somali communities. The reason for this was that official political life in 
Somali communities was dominated by males and the patrilinear clan structure. This does 
not mean that women are not present and do not have an impact in politics, quite the 
contrary I would say and this does represent a weakness in the study. As I was looking at 
official structures it became difficult to integrate women into my study.  
My informants were drawn from all over the system, from elected representatives, both 
ordinary and elders, appointed officials, people working in the administration but also people 
outside of the system that were either politically involved or had knowledge about topics 
that I found relevant to get a better understanding of the political and social structure in 
Somaliland. The use of key informants became a necessary tool in order to get enough 
information as it seemed difficult to get appointments that were missed rescheduled and 
because of my own health situation that contributed to less time doing interviews.  
 
The Qualitative Research Interview 
I decided to make qualitative research interviews my main source of information. This is a 
tool to get empirical knowledge of the informant’s daily life. By asking question you learn 
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about the informant's life world in their perspective. There is seldom discussion about the 
truth and the logic behind the statements that are made (Kvale 1997). The advantage of this 
approach is that you can accumulate a large amount of data in relatively short time. You can 
also follow up information during the interview and have the informant explain and clarify 
things that you do not understand. The main problem with this form of gathering data is that 
you are very dependent of the informant’s cooperation. Lack of understanding of the 
language and codes that exist in the arena you enter may lead to communication problems. 
The respondent may not understand what you are asking for and give answers that are either 
short or off the point or you may loose important meanings because you are not enough 
familiar with the language and social codes (Marshall and Rossman 1995). 
My interviews were semi structured. I would do this in the way that I had a long list of 
possible questions that were categorized into bigger topics. I would use some of the topics 
and my own suggested questions in order to get the conversation onto a topic that was of 
interest to me. The respondent was free to choose what to focus on under these 
circumstances. The danger is that the conversation is sidetracked and you get information 
that you find irrelevant. The advantage is of course that it gives more opportunities to go 
deeper into topics that seem more interesting than others. It also opens up for discovering 
new perspectives that you have not seen due to lack of knowledge. Attitudes that are 
contrary to your prior perception of the issues under study are also easier let into the 
conversation due to the lack of rigid control and can deepen and widen your understanding. 
The opposite is also possible, that you will allow too much time to be spent on confirming 
your prior perception of the case and thereby lose the opportunity to get new understanding. 
This is perhaps particularly true in my case where I was considered to have an understanding 
of the Somali community, religion and political culture that corresponded more with that of 
the respondents themselves because I was in many ways considered a Somali by marriage. 
 My husband came along to every interview and translated when the interviews were 
conducted in Somali. Using a translator is not the ideal situation because you lose meaning 
as you go from one language to another. My advantage was that he would translate directly 
into Norwegian for me and I avoided going through a third language. Most interviews were 
taped in order to be able to go in afterwards to check the information. This might have a 
negative effect on the respondent’s willingness to talk freely. Most of the people I talked to 
were men of some influence and they did not seem inhibited by the tape recorder. After the 
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fieldwork was done my husband would go in and check that his translations were correct and 
that he had not missed anything. He could also explain more contextual stuff that went 
unsaid later. The biggest problem when dealing with Somali is that it is a highly oral culture 
and they use a lot of time and words to explain things. In order to get a proper understanding 
one needs to know the oral traditions of proverbs and stories to get the right meaning. In that 
sense my husband had the disadvantage of having left Somaliland at the age of sixteen and 
his understanding of Somali language and culture was hampered by this fact and it could 
effect his translation of the interviews done in Somali. 
Using a family member as translator does have several advantages but it also constitutes 
challenges. Because my husband knows me well he would not be shy to criticize the form of 
the question or topic. This could lead to discussions between the two of us when doing 
interviews. It seemed that he was able to take some of my more complicated and academic 
question down to a level that made it possible for the respondents to answer them. My 
husband knew well what I was doing research on and he had been very interested in the 
political developments in Somaliland the last ten years. He also understood the Norwegian 
culture well after 16 years in Norway and had a certain idea of what needed to be explained. 
This interaction and correction was made possible because we were on much more equal 
terms than one usual is with a translator that you hardly know and that does not have any 
prior knowledge of the topic you are trying to get knowledge about. But it does also create a 
situation where the translator gets much more of a say in what you choose or are even 
allowed to ask about. We sometimes ended up using valuable time discussing if the question 
was good, appropriate or even possible to ask.  
I did twenty interviews (one with two informants together) during my stay in Somaliland 
most of them in the capital, Hargeysa, two in Berbera and one in Sheikh. In addition to this 
numerous informal conversations and discussions with people that I met during my stay has 
influenced my interpretation of my data as did keeping up with the local newspapers. Three 
were from the Guurti and three from the House of Representatives. The informants within 
the two houses came from different clans. I interviewed one minister in the sitting 
government, three officials appointed by the president who all were mayors of major towns 
in Somaliland, three of the informants were politically active men currently outside of the 
system where one was the founder of one of the new political parties in Somaliland. In 
addition to this I interviewed five persons who had knowledge of Somali culture, the clan 
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system, prior conflicts and administration. I tried to be conscious about getting my 
informants from different clans but I did not make clan the deciding criteria. This choice was 
made from the assumption that clan is not the most important factor in a relatively stable 
political environment and the assumption that clan has been misinterpreted as the most 
important explanatory factor in prior analyses of Somali political strategies. This will be 
explained and argued for further in a later chapter. 
I interviewed representatives from the elite. The advantages are that they have excessive 
expertise and knowledge about the area you are interested in and they are able to give a good 
overview of the system that they are in. They can also formulate politics, history and future 
plans in a more articulate way (Marshall and Rossman 1995). This was an important factor 
when choosing to spread my interviews over a greater field than initially planned. The 
informants did have to function as key informants. The weakness in my study is that I did 
not get to interview or talk with most of the informants more than once. This made it 
impossible to for instance evaluate the first interview and by looking at the topics covered 
there find out if there were things that needed to be more elaborated or maybe there were 
topics that I had missed out on that should be dealt with. The question I have to ask myself is 
whether it is possible to make general statements on the basis of these interviews since I did 
not get to do more than one assessment of the information provided. 
The drawback interviewing the elite is that it requires that the one doing the interview is able 
to demonstrate competence in the area of interest. The informant may also demand more 
active participation of the interviewer. There is also a danger that the informant may take 
charge of the interview and you will not get the information you need and instead be the 
subject of interest (Marshall and Rossman 1995). My experience was that most informants 
would use the first five minutes to ask about what I wanted from them. The fact that I 
dressed appropriately in a Somali and a Muslim perspective and brought my husband and 
child along to many interviews seemed to make most people let down their guards very fast 
and they would talk relatively freely. Only once did I experience that a respondent did not 
want me to take notes or tape the conversation. This was apparently the direct result of the 
fact that he was new in the job. He did not want to say something that could be considered 
“wrong” by the government still he had no problems with me using the information I got 
from him in my project. 
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My interviews took place in various settings. When you interview officials you often have to 
meet them at their work place. People that were outside of the system I usually invited to my 
house and they got tea, mineral water and simple serving like cookies. Some of the 
representatives I also met at their home or we went out for dinner in the evening and talked 
over dinner and after. Since I was a woman this would always be in restaurant were you sat 
outside at private tables sheltered from other customers so the informant could feel confident 
that the conversation would be of a more private character. The problem with these various 
settings was that they would never be entirely private. In my house there would always be 
people around including my three-year-old son that would demand attention from time to 
time and relatives from my husbands’ family either permanent houseguests or visitors. Since 
I was talking to the elite one often needs to be introduced (Marshall and Rossman 1995) This 
meant that since I often met people only once the people that had been able to arrange for the 
meeting would be coming along. I got the impression that they expected to be allowed to be 
there. They had gotten the invitation and by being there they would be able to signal their 
own influence but they seldom took part in the conversations. This might have made some of 
my informants censor what they wanted to say. There seemed to be a rather healthy freedom 
of speech in Somaliland at the time being and few seemed shy about coming with 
information that would put their country’s political situation in a bad light. But several of the 
incidents described by my informants and in the papers clearly indicated that people in 
position were also easily dismissed by sometimes random and inexplicable reasons and that 
my informants did take some risk in talking to me. This made me decide to make my 
respondents anonymous in the writing out of the data and also my main contact. 
The interviews that took place in peoples offices seldom lasted for more than an hour. This 
meant that I did not always have the time to go deep into all the subjects that I wanted to. 
The consequence of this was that I had to focus each interview on certain areas that I would 
have decided on before I went there. In following interviews I would make sure that some of 
the themes from the preceding interviews would be covered and then I would move on to 
new themes. In this way I would try to find out whether the information gathered was 
reliable. The interviews not done in people’s office hours lasted between one and two hours. 
This would depend on the language skills of the informant. If he spoke English I could 
manage without my husband’s translation and I got more time to talk about the topics I had 
selected for the interview. When you use a translator a lot of time is lost translating. There 
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will always be one participant that is passive. The informants tended to be bored easier and 
you tend to finish up earlier. When the informant spoke English those who came along with 
me seemed to find it easier to leave me alone with the informant after a while and the 
interview lasted longer. The advantage of doing interviews at home was the same. The 
informants seemed more relaxed and less rushed by the informal atmosphere and even those 
who only spoke Somali and where translations were needed talked for a longer time. 
Secondary Literature 
Most research projects demand use of multiple sources. Many problems arise as you work 
and using multiple sources can help even out biases you build into your research and the fact 
that one sometimes haven't solved all the problems one ran into in the best way. 
In my research I have included books written about the former Somalia/Somaliland, research 
articles, newspaper articles from the small and embryonic press that one finds in Somaliland, 
documents produced by various Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and various 
articles found on the Internet. The books and articles are from various fields, from political 
science, anthropology, sociology and so forth. The newspaper articles I have used are 
primarily about politics and the reports are related to the provision of social services and the 
rebuilding of infrastructure. The goal has been to get a broad understanding of the workings 
of the Somali society both present and past and to get information about selected areas from 
more than my interviews. 
The most important thing to keep in mind when one uses other sources is that they are 
produced for other purposes than your own. It is important to understand this purpose 
because it will have consequences for the analyses you do (Robson 1993). To understand for 
instance the Somali political and social structures I have had to rely on I.M. Lewis who is a 
social anthropologist that has worked in the field since the early fifties. His research has 
been a corner stone in any research project on Somalis and their society. What I have found 
is that his focus is not necessarily biased but the common interpretation of his texts is in the 
sense that they focus mostly on conflict elements and segmentary forces in Somali relations. 
His research has come up with many insights about Somali structures. I have chosen to play 
down the "endemic" conflict element since I think that other literature that I use point out 
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that for instance conflict management is just as important and common a practice within the 
Somali clan structure. 
Something else and related that was pointed out in another master thesis (Abdi 1996) was 
that much of the literature on Somalia has some sort of bias that is reflected in the writing. 
By this the author touched upon the fact that every text is a social construction and one 
needs to ask oneself certain question when using it. Who are the people behind the text and 
what motives do they have for writing what they do? This is true for both public documents 
and social science research texts. I have tried to get as broad a sample as possible of texts 
based from the geographical area in question, Somaliland. 
Since I am writing about Somaliland I have collected data that can be said to build up under 
the notion of a Somaliland state as opposed to a Somali. This will by many members of the 
Somali community be regarded as a political choice. I have not focused on literature that 
treats the whole Somali community only parts of it. The differences between the northern 
and the southern Somalia are pronounced both due to colonial experiences and post colonial 
ones and my findings can not be said to relate to the whole of the former Somalia. 
Some will say just by looking at my thesis and the title that it is pro-Somaliland and is built 
around invalid information and it is subversive in that it recognizes Somaliland as an entity 
and thereby undermines the existence of Somalia. My area of interest has been the former 
British protectorate Somaliland that coincides with today's Somaliland that is not recognized 
by any foreign nation or international organization. The information I have used is related to 
this geographical area. I find it hard to dismiss the governmental structures that are 
recognized in the press, by individuals and the newest literature. My main purpose for 
choosing the literature I have has been to enhance the reliability of my research. This means 
that much literature that is more relevant to the former Somalia and the south in particular 
has been omitted. This is not to reduce the significance of the former nation of Somalia or to 
dismiss that there can be a future to this country. The main task for me as a researcher then 
becomes to be critical to my sources and be specific about what my findings reflect and most 
important do not. 
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Concluding remarks 
The purpose of this chapter has been to show how one as a researcher always enters the field 
with values, opinions and intentions and that these are formed by what you bring with you 
but also in how you are perceived, in my case an assumed understanding and sympathy 
towards the clan structure and the fact that I was considered one of them, a Somali by 
marriage. I have given a thorough description of my research design and discussed the 
weaknesses and strengths in my choice of method in order to achieve reliability which in a 
qualitative study is at best achieved by disclosing how the data are obtained and how you 
yourself influence the process. 
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Paths to present political formations in Somaliland 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will try to answer my first research question which is what the political 
strategies that led to the disintegration of Somalia were. I will be looking at the Somali 
inhabited area from the beginning of colonization and up to the time of my study. I have 
chosen to give an account of the “ideal” pastoral political strategies first in order to give an 
idea of how the Somalis have been able to co-exist in a hostile and scarce environment 
without any regulation by a central state and which largely functioned in pre-colonial time. 
Next I will outline the political idea of the Somali inhabited territories as an assumed 
culturally, religiously and linguistic homogenous area that constitutes a nation, so called 
pan-somalism. This can be considered an overarching political ideology that has been 
structuring politics within Somalia and the responses to external input like development and 
military aid, bordering conflicts and so forth. Then I will outline the historical background of 
the formation of Somalia and their consequent politics during different political regime to 
identify the factors contributing to the disintegration. I will move on and give an account of 
the internal developments within today’s Somaliland up to the time of my study in order to 
show the integrating forces at play after the declaration of independence of Somaliland. 
Finally I will give a description of the system that was set up at the time of my field work in 
order to show how the system has built in conflict solving responsibilities and intentions of 
power sharing and both horizontal and vertical integration. 
The Pastoral Democracy 
The first one to use this term about the Somali political culture was Ioan M. Lewis and some 
of the politicians I talked to also used the same term to describe the transitional state 
structure at the time of my field work. This is a powerful story that is used in order to link 
the traditional pastoral culture of the Somalis to modern day political strategies. Lewis has 
been the main source on Somali culture and society since the early sixties. He is an 
anthropologist and his writings have been a favored source in recent interpretations of 
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Somali conflicts. His initial labeling of the Somali pastoral society as in a constant state of 
feud and conflict has found its way to the media and conference tables. The disintegration of 
the Somali state has been attributed to their segmentary social structure and warring 
instincts, a way of interpreting the conflict that is not necessarily offering many solutions to 
the problems of the former Somalia. Lewis still offers a very good description of their 
conflict solving tools that counters this perception and he recognizes the main sources of 
conflict which is competition for scarce resources. 
There are five elements in the Somali conflict solving traditions (Menkhaus 1999). The diya 
paying group is the lowest and most stable unit of the clan system. If a member of such a 
group cause material damage or is responsible for the death of someone of another clan the 
diya is responsible for economically compensating for the other clan’s loss. The purpose of 
diya was to avoid longstanding conflicts and blood feud. This practice still exists among the 
Somalis. The clan elders are trusted members of their clan. They are responsible for 
negotiation in conflicts on behalf of their clan. The title is not hereditary although some 
families do get special significance in a clan. It is based on valued and necessary skills like 
being a good poet, skilled negotiator or for being a respected religious leader. The xeer is the 
social contract that existed among the Somalis on all levels and to some extent exists today. 
The xeer can be compared to the social contract that one finds discussed in political 
philosophy. It had to some extent integrated Islamic law, Sharia and was what you can call 
the custom law of the Somalis. Lewis’ labeling of the political system as democratic rested 
on the conception of the institution of xeer. Somali culture is largely oral and the xeer 
consisted of a long line of unwritten rules of conduct assuring predictability and the 
possibility of negotiation and building of trust among the different clans. It also consisted of 
settlements between the various groups over time (Lewis 1988).  Shir was the meeting of the 
elders where they consulted each other and negotiated agreements. It was relatively open and 
democratic as everybody was allowed to speak and this was where the clan's positions in a 
dispute were ratified. It was a consensus building process and all decisions taken at these 
meetings were legitimate and binding. The elders were always elected from their clan on the 
basis of consensus. They could legitimately represent their clan’s interest at the shir. Rules 
of conduct assured that everyone did their best at reaching a settlement. This means that 
peaceful conflict solving has had had a relatively fixed structure over time in the Somali 
culture. 
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For a settlement to come into action both parties must respect it. As there was no central 
authority to enforce it in pre-colonial Somali territories the fulfillment rested largely on the 
individual but first and foremost on the clan. If the accused refused to abide by the 
agreement his clansmen could force it into action by negotiating with him and sometimes let 
some of the burden rest on the diya paying group itself. The voluntary obligation to honor 
agreements reached were crucial in order for the system to function well. This system has 
been in play for a long time and in practice the clans themselves sanctioned and ratified the 
decisions that were reached by the shir. If a conflict escalated into violence there were strict 
rules. Women, children and old people were to be spared and for instance the rapes that 
begun to take place during the Siyad Barre regime to humiliate and destroy Isaq families are 
both unacceptable and prohibited by the xeer. Somali history is a history of a nomadic 
population competing for scarce resources but the xeer gave predictability and rules to live 
by. This means that the portrayal of Somalia and Somali political culture as violent and 
erratic is rather biased. The Somalis have for a long time shared a common notion of how to 
deal with conflicts and their practice has largely respected this. There are no records of 
conflicts of the magnitude that followed in the aftermath of the Barre regime in Somali 
history which means that it is not entirely correct to assume that the problem of modern day 
conflicts in Somalia lies solely in the clan structure and that this is the appendicitis of 
Somalia. The pastoral democracy as a political idea represents the “high culture” of the 
Somalis and has substantial support within the elite at least. The clan structure as a part of 
this is a strong and lasting social structure among the Somalis which is easy accessible to 
promote singular as well as collective interests and this has had subsequent consequences for 
how any Somali politics has played out since it is a strong and effective structure that has 
been seen as legitimate and even necessary in order to both survive and coexist with both 
other clans and other ethnic groups in the area.  
Somalia 
Pan-Somalism 
Pan-Somalism seems to have it’s origin in the Dervish fights from the end of the eighteenth 
century that ended in 1920. Sayid Mohamed Abdille Hassan, the Mad Mullah of Somaliland 
was the founder of this movement. He belonged to one of many Islamic religious 
 43
brotherhoods that in a Somali context were revived from quite early in the eighteenth 
century (Samatar 1988). They were established structures that could transform into more 
political organization. They had a strict structure of absolute leadership and as colonialism 
started to penetrate into the nomad’s domain the brotherhoods rejuvenated the idea of jihad, 
holy war to protect their communities. The Dervish struggle began as a war against the 
Ethiopians that had invaded traditional Somali territory in the Haud in order to feed its huge 
army in their colonizing efforts in the whole of the Horn. Over time the Mullah allied 
himself with other clans within today’s Somalia and it became the first real struggle between 
the colonialists/non-Somalis and the Somalis and it manifested the belief in a common 
Somali identity for the first time.  
Besides Somalia consisting of the British Protectorate and the Italian colony in the south the 
Somalis inhabit three other territories: the Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the south, 
the Ogaden in Ethiopia to the east and Djibouti to the north-west. The Northern Frontier 
District of Kenya did not see any Somali nationalism before 1960 because the territory was 
heavily controlled and the most remote and underdeveloped in Kenya. More than half of the 
population consisted of Somalis, mostly settled in the eastern parts. As it turned out, the 
British government in fear of provoking conflict with Ethiopia and France who also had their 
Somali issues to resolve finally decided to leave a possible uniting of Somali occupied 
territories to the new post-colonial governments of Somalia and Kenya. A commission stated 
that the Somalis and the Muslim population in the area would prefer to be united with the 
Somali Republic but that this could not take place before Kenyan independence. This in turn 
resulted in Kenyan nationalism winning over the Somalis hope that this would be an issue 
between the British and Somali government. The relationship between the British and the 
Somali Republic was severely damaged and diplomatic relations broken abruptly off when 
the Somali nationalist realized that the issue would have to be solved without the British 
support for unification. The Somali cause was seen as being contrary to the colonial struggle 
towards independence and no one was willing to define neither Ethiopia who claimed 
Ogaden nor Kenya as colonizers and what little support the Somali cause got never seemed 
to amount to any strength to be reckoned with. The rule seemed to be that the borders of the 
colonial era was to stand as a possible balkanization of Africa was quite foreseeable since 
most colonial entities cut across areas inhabited by the same ethnic groups and most colonies 
were inhabited by several different ethnic groups and reorganization seemed impossible 
without conflict.  
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The French colonizer did not want to lose its control over the Djibouti harbor and sought to 
control the territory in a totally different way after independence than the former colonial 
powers of Somalia (Laitin and Samatar 1988). In order to weaken the influence of the 
Somalis in French Somaliland political measures were taken in order to strengthen the Afar 
who were an equally large group in the territory but not necessarily against unification with 
Somalia. The fact that the Ethiopians depended on the Djibouti harbor for supplies made 
both Ethiopia and France work against unification with Somalia. In addition Ethiopia was in 
a dispute over legal boundaries between Ogaden and Somalia. The Ethiopians never 
accepted the claim of giving back the Haud part of Ogaden and in large suppressed the 
Somali population of the area. Somali nationalism was banned and the government 
demanded that Somali political aspirations were to be expressed in Amharic. The area was 
underdeveloped in terms of education and medical services and there was nothing that 
indicated a possible reunion with Somalia. When independence arrived only the Italian 
colony and the British Protectorate were to join.  
The Dervish war has taken on mythical proportions within Somali history and it is there it’s 
strength lies as the accomplishments of the struggle are to be questioned since the structure 
of the organization was in no way democratic in the way the pastoral structure was and their 
goal was often not understood as looting of other herds was a way of life in the pastoral 
communities and the Mullahs alliances were not entirely understood or easy to anticipate 
(Samatar 1988). Modern-day pan-somalism is an overarching nationalistic idea that searches 
to build a bridge between the Somali communities that until independence functioned as 
independent and egalitarian clans occupying overlapping territories with no central authority 
regulating the distribution of wealth. This idea of one nation without a state has structured 
Somali politics since before independence in all territories inhabited by the Somalis and is 
still influencing what political solutions that are seen as wanted and possible in solving the 
problem of the failed state; Somalia. 
Independence and Civilian Rule 
What is known as Somalia today consisted of two different territories managed by two 
different colonial powers before independence. Somaliland was a British protectorate from 
1886 to 1961 and the rest of Somalia was an Italian colony from 1889 to 1961 only 
interrupted by British rule for ten years from 1941 to 1949 when it once again was turned 
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over to the Italians as a UN trust territory. The decision of a union between the two 
territories was reached at a conference in Mogadishu the spring of 1960. The two territories 
legislative bodies set up under the preparation for independence were to merge into a new 
National Assembly responsible for electing a new president (Contini 1969). The two 
territories were united 1st July 1960 and the unification of two territories populated by the 
Somalis became a reality and so the state known today as Somalia. 
The Somalis organized according to more than clan at independence (Lewis 2002). If one 
looks to Samatar’s (1989) analyses of the rural transformation in Northern Somalia he points 
to the formation of an urban petty bourgeoisie as the Somali territory was penetrated by 
traders of Asian and Middle Eastern decent and the colonial powers increasing both export 
of livestock and the import of commodities. The vivid trade and the integration into the 
regional economy in turn made it possible for an unproductive urban elite consisting of 
amongst others the middlemen in the livestock business to strengthen. They benefited from 
the rural production without having to develop the production forces itself (Samatar 1988). 
A small group of educated elite also existed at the dawn of independence and with the 
strengthening of the urban economy a new class of traders emerged and these groups 
combined with traditional clan leaders formed the political forces of what was to become 
Somalia. 
 The Somalis organization into clans was an issue before independence as well as after 
(Lewis 2002). The political elite felt that the divisive nature of their clan system in part was 
responsible for the partition of the Somali territory in the past between different colonial 
powers (Laitin and Samatar 1987). The Somali Youth League formation was a direct 
response to the fact that Britain at the end of World War Two controlled four out of five 
Somali territories which gave rise to renewed pan-Somali nationalism. The political parties 
that were present at liberation did not represent clans per se but no doubt did those who 
wanted a position use his clan in order gather popular support and the political parties were 
also dominated by certain clans. The largest party of the first ten years of post-colonial 
democracy was the Somali Youth League and it was dominated by the Majerteen which 
belonges to the Darod.  In the elite clan affiliation publicly stated were seen as a threat to 
building national unity and they referred to clan as a problem of the past and their clan in 
terms of their ex-clan. Even though the political elite renounced the clan structure it still was 
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the dominating structure in the whole of society and a structure necessary to take advantage 
of in order to gain political positions in the new democracy. 
The new state had a meager financial base due to poorly developed production forces. This 
was mainly due to its position on the Horn of Africa in a hostile environment being 
detrimental in creating a growing and diverse economy. The decentralized and stateless 
pastoral mode of production was well adapted to these circumstances but certainly had its 
limitation as the region was more and more integrated in the surrounding economies. When 
Somalia gained statehood they depended on loans and grants from the outside world from 
day one. In order to secure funds Somalia joined diverse international organizations like the 
International Monetary Fund, the Organization of African Unity and became associates of 
the European Economic Community attracting foreign loans and aid amounting to well over 
$100 million (Samatar 1988). China caught interest in the new state as well but it was Russia 
that came to the rescue. Somalia attracted military aid from Russia worth of £11 millions in 
1963 alienating themselves from their surrounding states (Lewis 2002). The West and the 
US in particular was trying to be cautious not to support the Somali irredentist aspirations to 
unite all territories inhabited by Somalis. This was also integrated into the constitution of the 
Republic and the five points of the star in the Somali flag represent the five Somali 
territories (Laitin et al 1988). The result of the Russian military support was tension in the 
whole region as the West and the US resented Russia getting influence and intervening in 
what they saw as the liberation of Africa (Samatar 1988). The next decades saw shifts in 
alliances between the Communist world and the US that in large guaranteed an input of 
money and arms in the Somali state apparatus quite remarkable for the region. This Cold 
War competition over time contributed to a militarization of Somalia unique in an African 
context and it also filled the treasury of a dependent state. Thus the state became the sole 
arena of competition for resources and being in position secured access to both symbolic and 
material power, moreover mobilizing one’s clan became means to this end, more over 
mobilization one’s clan networks the means to get there. 
Democratic elections prevailed through the first decade of independence and funding from 
the outside kept motivation and interest for gaining office high. A strong opposition was 
created during the first democratic period due to dissatisfaction with the distribution of seats 
between the regions which ultimately also corresponds to the distribution of different clans 
(Lewis 2002). In both the 1964 and the 1969 election many of the candidates switched party 
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after the election and joined the Somali Youth League. The result was most striking at the 
last election where the number of candidates reached over 1000, the number of parties 64. 
Once the parliament filled up all candidates joined the winning party leaving only one man 
in opposition. The main motivation joining the winning party was to be able to share the 
spoils of the post-colonial state and regain what they had spent on campaigning (Samatar 
1988). 
The civil governments of the early republic had few economic strategies in order to develop 
the country as a whole (Samatar 1988). The years between the first and second election were 
spent trying to integrate the two territories with totally different colonial experience and 
therefore totally different ways of organizing the state apparatuses. The two territories had 
different administrational languages, English in the north and Italian in the south. Whereas 
the Italian territory was administered with firm and oppressive measures disrupting existing 
power structures the north had been laxly administered by the British government. They had 
no other interest in the territory than to secure live stock supplies getting out and governed 
through indirect rule that granted power to the indigenous elite (Lewis 2002). The civilian 
regime was unable to agree upon a script for the Somali language which could have settled 
the problem of a common language. The two bureaucracy were totally different, where as 
the Italians had a large bureaucracy where corruption flourished and the pay was low, the 
north were organized in a much more lean structure founded on British ideals of autonomy 
and the rule of law. The pay for a job in the bureaucracy was significantly higher in the 
north. Being unable to agree on a common script of the Somali language integration seemed 
to be difficult and the differences between the north and the south in both bureaucracy 
procedures, laws, pay and language gave rise to grievances put forward both from southern 
and northern elites.  
The two colonies had radically different colonial experiences that they brought with them 
into the union.  The Italian part of the territory had seen some development in productive 
forces during its years as an Italian colony due to the fact that Italy had a much more 
aggressive colonial policy than the British. Italy’s interest in African colonies was to gain 
overseas areas that could absorb some of the overpopulation in Italy and a need for overseas 
markets. The Italians had a strong military presence in the Somali territory and trained an 
army consisting of Somalis, Eritreans and Arabs teaching them Italian with the aim to 
suppress any resistance against Italian dominance (Samatar 1988). The Italians took over the 
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most productive agricultural land and enslaved the former owners. Infrastructure like 
irrigation systems, roads and refineries to support the new production of cash crops like 
bananas, cotton, sugarcane and castor beans were built. The British had little interest in 
developing the Protectorate and the development of social infrastructure and physical 
infrastructure was only undertaken if it was necessary in order to sustain the degree of 
control deemed necessary.  In general any development efforts made by the civilian 
government after independence were perceived to be focused in urban areas and in the 
embryonic industrial sector which predominantly was placed in the south. The majority of 
Somalis were in the pastoral economy and the government did nothing more than the 
colonial powers had done. Taxes were imposed on livestock and commodities and little was 
done to improve the conditions for the pastoral population when it came to social 
infrastructure, veterinary services and trying to regulate and control deteriorating 
environmental conditions. Changes caused by overgrazing and changes brought to the 
pastoral mode of production due to both political integration and economic integration with 
the surrounding states and the world economy over time. The rural areas lost to the urban 
areas and the north to the south. The elite in the north was already feeling alienated by the 
new state. 
The M. Syiad Barre regime 
1969 saw the end of civilian rule in Somalia when the military forces lead by general M. 
Siyaad Barre seized power in a peaceful coup (Lewis 2002). The new military regime set out 
with bold and promising statements of what they wanted to accomplish. What was coined 
scientific socialism was launched as the political ideology of the new regime (Samatar 
1988). And a maoist personal cult around Barre also was launched by the regime. The new 
leaders’ agenda was manifold. Everyone should have the right to work, the productive forces 
was to be developed in order to bring progress to the country, a national script and a literacy 
campaign to be issued, tribalism highly associated with the exploitation of the state and it’s 
resources was to be abolished and likewise state corruption and mal practice in state 
apparatuses were to end. Political parties were banned and elections would be held at an 
appropriate time in the future. A war on corruption started and the income gap between the 
elite and ordinary people were reduced in order to create more equality 
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The military regime decided to use the Latin script for the Somali language and thus solved a 
problem that the civilian governments had not been able to solve (Laitin et al 1988). The 
final decision on a common Somali script is maybe in fact one of the biggest 
accomplishments of the military regime as it made integration between different segments of 
the elite possible and with increased literacy social mobility should rise too. It finally made 
it foreseeable to integrate fully the two former colonies that had joined forces in 1969. 
There was little resistance at this point in time as there was discontent within the ruling 
classes with the civilian governments lacking ability to bring prosperity and development to 
larger segments of the population and to the whole of the territory (Samatar 1988). The 
pastoral and mainly rural population did not show resistance at this point, this might be due 
to the fact that despite the deteriorating conditions for the rural population widespread 
illiteracy, slow communications, poor infrastructure and the fact that the clan functioned as a 
security net meant that they did not see any need or way to come forward with their 
grievances .The elite in fact also kept their links to the rural areas in the sense that their 
clansmen would approach them for employment possibilities and they also upheld economic 
ties by keeping profitable livestock with their rural clansmen. Thus the discontent mainly 
originated from the urban elite that were dissatisfied with their proportion of the spoils from 
the post colonial state (Samatar 1988). The military forces seemed to be the only part of the 
petty bourgeoisie that had not been torn by internal conflict due to the fact that they had 
concentrated on the pan-Somali cause defending the borders towards Ethiopia during the 
first years of the civilian rule. As the politics of the civilian government changed and they 
were left with little to do than to observe the mismanagement of the state they chose to act. 
At that point they were the only group within the state able to pull in the same direction. 
 Even though the regime sat out to improve conditions in the rural sector their achievements 
were meager. The sugar industry and the production of electricity were nationalized 
(Samatar 1988). The two largest sectors, export of livestock and bananas were not 
nationalized. A mix of strict state control and free enterprise continued to be the rule as the 
new regime tried to get control over the productive forces. Since the pastoral economy was 
profitable already it was the agricultural sector that was to be restructured. Whereas thirty 
per cent of the civilian government’s budget went to the industrial sector the military regime 
turned this around and put thirty per cent in the rural sector. Still the result was not 
impressive. In agriculture they set out to form communal farms organized in various ways. It 
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turned out to be difficult to create any surplus in this way of structuring production. It was 
alien to the farmers that did not put in the hours they were supposed to on communal land.  
Fisheries has never been favored among the pastoralists but a draught in 1974-75 lead the 
government to resettle 15 000 nomads by the coast and in cooperation with Russia built up 
the industry. Still productivity fell sharply towards the eighties as the nomads that had been 
resettled saw possibilities to go back into livestock as conditions once again got favorable. 
Over time there was a decline in all sectors. Even though prizes on live stock soared 
productivity did not. This was also the sector the state invested least money in and where 
they still took out the most money. Due to the fact that little was done to control this sector 
the middle men became even more powerful. The new regime thus failed in creating the 
conditions necessary in order for people to engage in economic networks that did not 
originate from within their own clan. People were still dependent on their clan in order to 
survive and the clan never lost its importance in the way the regime intended. 
During the first period of the Barre regime there was little change in the distribution of clans 
in state organs on the highest level, the Darod still dominated but from being Majerteen 
dominated the clans of the general and his immediate family were gaining influence over 
others. Barre himself was a Marehan, his mother Ogaden and his son-in-law Dhulbahante, 
this power constellation popularized in the abbreviation MOD (Laitin et al 1988). The 
regime was oppressive of public opinions and people talked in code of what they saw as 
favoritism of certain clans. Samatar (1988) seems to think that clan did not matter much in 
the distribution of positions as does the more traditional scholars on Somalis like Lewis 
(2002) and Laitin and Samatar (1988). Nevertheless the clan issue prevailed within the state 
all through the seventies and never seized to be addressed in the way that grievances towards 
government policies were often articulated as clan grievances. What is safe to say is that to 
take clan identities to be primordial constructions and segmentary in nature is a 
simplification of the realities. What is true is that clan was and is a vital part of the social 
grid in Somali communities on all levels and that it could and most likely was the most 
common vehicle to climb socially, gain influence and exert political control. The economic 
development that could have weakened this network of patrimonial distribution never took 
place, either because the government policies were misguided or because the elite did not 
see it fit to actually enforce real policies of redistribution. The networks of clan were gaining 
importance instead of loosing it and thus prepared the ground for exclusion of those not 
influential or important enough to be integrated. In this environment a further politicizing of 
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clan occurred both in order for the state to be able to stay in control and those excluded to 
possibly get access to the sole source of profit, the dependent state milking its geopolitical 
position to a maximum.   
The Ogaden War 
Pan-Somali aspirations came to a peak again in 1977 (Laitin and Samatar 1988)  Haile 
Selassi’s regime had crumbled in 1974 and there was radicalization in Ethiopian politics that 
led to internal disintegration. In this environment the Western Somali Liberation Front 
(WSL), a nationalistic separatist movement also was founded with the goal to liberate the 
Somalis of the Ogaden from Ethiopian rule and join Somalia. The radicalization in Ethiopian 
politics made the US withdraw its support and the communist world with Soviet and Cuba in 
front moved in as the regime confessed to a Marxist ideology (Samatar 1988). This created 
unrest in Somalia that no longer felt sure that their borders with Ethiopia would not be even 
further pushed. During 1977 Barre had to let large parts of the countries army “resign” in 
order to join the liberation war in the Ogaden. The Ogaden clan was a vital part of Barres 
tribal coalition in order to secure power during the 70s as it was his maternal clan. The 
Ogaden was also the only area that it seemed possible to get control over of the five Somali 
territories and also the most important economically since part of the Ogaden is the Haud 
that is a common grazing area for both the Isaaq of the north and the dictators own clan, the 
Darod in the south. 
The Somali leadership wanted to secure military support from the US when realizing that the 
Soviet were not going to support their irredentism (Samatar 1988). The US was alarmed by 
the Ethiopians calling the fighting in the Ogaden a Somali invasion and reconsidered, 
withdrawing any promised support, probably afraid they could get into a long lasting conflict 
impossible to get out of. The Arab world refused to give any support as long as they did not 
put an end Soviet military presence within the Somalia. At the end of the year all military 
personnel were asked to leave. The equipment and the troops were transferred to the 
Ethiopian side and in early 1978 the Barre regime announced publicly that they had entered 
the conflict even though most of their troops had joined their Somali brothers in Ogaden the 
year before (Laitin and Samatar 1988)) and the rest of the region already had defined the war 
as an invasion and not a liberation war (Samatar 1988). Only three months later they were 
defeated. They had overestimated the willingness of the West to support their fight and had 
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no allies that could support them in their cause. The conflict had caused 25 000 casualties on 
the Somali side and the repressive nature of the regime became even more clear after the 
humiliating defeat in Ogaden. The refugee influx following the war due to the Ethiopian 
government’s expulsion of Somalis further destabilized the regime. The country had no 
economy to support the large amount of refugees and tension rose between the local 
population and the refugees. Somalia was put under severe political, economic and 
environmental strain which the leadership seemed unable to handle. Barre shifted alliances 
with clans in order to secure his position only achieving resistance and the further 
mobilization of those alienated by the regime. Finally in 1980 Somalia officially became a 
patron of the US who due to the political developments in the Middle Eastern areas wanted 
to have a strong military presence in the area. This shift in alliances finally lead to the UN 
intervention that miserably failed in restoring peace and the disintegration along identifiable 
clan lines structured around the competition for economic gains continued. In this unstable 
environment the Somalis were even more dependent on their clan network, and a clan 
network that had been severely distorted by some twenty years of institutionalizing 
patrimonial distribution of spoils paired with a deteriorating economic environment tearing 
down social structures and inducing violence.  
Somaliland 
Somaliland, the British Protectorate reached independence a few days before the rest of 
Somalia and the legislative assembly passed a law of union between the two territories. This 
document was never signed by the south and therefore not binding there. An Act of Union 
was also produced by the south but laws only approved “in principle”. It was only seven 
months later that a proper and common Act of Union with retroactive power came into place 
that was binding for the whole territory (Contini 1969). When the Somalis voted over the 
new constitution less than 100 000 of an estimated population of 650 000 in the Protectorat’s 
showed up at the election and only fifty per cent voted for. The result was ignored as the 
population was a mere per cent of the total population of the new Somalia and the 
overwhelming yes in the south was taken as support for the new constitution (Lewis 2002).  
The general consent over time was that it was not evident at the starting point of the new 
state that Moqadishu and the south should have precedence over the north. Both parts had 
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colonial legacies that made it conceivable that both Moqadishu and Hargeysa could become 
the new capital (Samatar 1988). The Isaaq population was dominant in the North but found 
them self reduced to guests in the south without much leverage or influence. The Barre 
regime favoritism of the clan of his father, mother and son-in-law, all Darod clans in order to 
keep order in the ranks made the northern elite lag behind even more both in real influence. 
From being a separate territory with its own administration the Somaliland elite were over 
time either forced to join the sitting regime or be administered or ignored by it. The loss of 
influence and access to the spoils that the post-colonial state could offer became more and 
more apparent and resistance grew strong during the eighties mainly within the Isaaq that 
were the largest clan in the north and that occupy most of the territory of the former British 
Protectorate. 
The terrorization of the Isaaq population in the north started in the aftermath of the Ogaden 
war with Ethiopia in 1978-79. The Somali state armed and taught the Ogaden refugees in the 
border camps to use firearms in order to fight the Ethiopians to regain Ogaden (Lewis 2002, 
Human Rights Watch 1990). Many of the refugees were Darods that competed for the same 
grazing lands and wells as the Isaaq. The refugees evidently did not engage in any liberation 
fights but started to terrorize the Isaaq population in the area. The problem escalated and the 
Somali state seemed to have little interest in putting an end to the looting, murders and rapes 
that took place. The Isaaq counter action was to create and support an under group of the 
WSLF to counter the abuse from the Ogaden paramilitary groups. This did not come out 
well with the government that disarmed the group and moved them to a location in the 
interior outside of the area that was most heavily afflicted by the conflict. The population of 
the north was left to fend for themselves and discontent with the government and feeling of 
being inferior to the south grew even stronger. . 
 The refugees seemed to enjoy rights that the Isaaq population was deprived of. The health- 
and educational systems in the camps were seen as superior to that of the general population. 
The government confiscated land from the Isaaq and redistributed it to refugees that made 
money from selling it back to their rightful owners (Human Rights Watch 1990). The 
government also used the refugees to get economic aid from the world community as well as 
food aid. People claimed later that this food was sold on the open market for the state to 
profit on. The Isaaq were asked to help their “brothers” and in many state offices, the 
refugees found paid jobs. They earned far more than the local population something that 
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worsened the relationship between the two groups. In short, the government used the refugee 
population as information source on the local population and created a hostile environment 
that would ultimately lead to disintegration. 
In a report made by the elders of the Isaaq several points were made. Under Siyad Barre the 
northern region had been severely neglected (Lewis 2002). The health and educational sector 
was not developed at all. There had been no building of new roads and the maintenance of 
public buildings was non-existing. While ten factories had been built in the south after 1969, 
the north had two, one started by the civilian governments prior to that date and the other a 
cement factory that was not yet finished. There had been no agricultural projects in the areas 
that practiced cultivation. There existed no plans for regulating the problem of overgrazing 
and the veterinary service was poor. This worried the elders since the racing of livestock for 
export was the regions main source of income. 
At the same time new import laws were adopted. One needed licenses to import foreign 
goods and the state made its point by confiscating goods of the total value of US$ 50 million 
at the port of Berbera where the region got most of its imported goods through (Human 
Rights Watch 1990). The import licenses could only be made in Mogadishu and there was a 
three month waiting period to get it. In the north the only goods they received license for 
was rice and only 22 permits were given. The former principle that had governed 
commercial activity was free enterprise and the new restriction prevented the region from 
importing necessary goods and added to the grievances they had towards the government. 
When the two territories had merged in 1960 a large part of the commercial and educated 
elite in the north had moved to the south and the capital of Mogadishu to maximize their 
opportunities for getting a good job and making a profit (Laitin and Samatar 1988, Samatar 
1988). In the early eighties, some of them returned back north and was shocked to learn of 
the sorry state the former capital of Somaliland was in. They started fund raising to build up 
the city hospital that lacked everything from electricity to bandages. Everyone involved in 
this was arrested accused of subversive activity. The upcoming trial had to be postponed 
once because of a student riot against it. The rumor had it that some would receive the death 
penalty (Human Rights Watch 1990). They were all convicted to sentences ranging form ten 
years to life in prison. The trial was based on the testimony of a WSLF member that 
evidently had fled the country before the trials started. 
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In 1988 Barre entered a treaty with Ethiopia’s Mengistu that they would not support the 
other country’s rebel movements by allowing them to operate on the other state's soil (Lewis 
2002). As a direct result, the spring of 1988 the Somali National Movement (SNM) founded 
in the Diaspora in the eighties went into Somaliland as they were expelled from Ethiopia 
where they had built up their organization in the region, and the civil war started. The 
organization was mobilizing the Isaaqs, the largest clan in Somaliland and mainly drew their 
economic support from the Diaspora population. Since they did not appear to have ties to the 
former regimes and the elite coalitions within Somalia they had considerable legitimacy in 
the population. The peace agreement between Siyad Barre and the Ethiopian government 
had left them no choice other than to leave Ethiopia where they were now unwanted and to 
start the liberation war of Somalia.  
The government soldier's retaliation was brutal. The civilian population became their target. 
People were summarily shot in the streets, in their shops and homes and property were 
severely damaged. Both Hargeysa and Buroc were bombed by government planes while the 
terrified population fled (Africa Watch Report 1990). Houses and roads were practically 
demolished. The government encouraged the non-Isaaq population to leave and mass 
arresting of male Isaaqs started. Many were killed and mass graves are found through out 
Somaliland today. The government forces was driven out of the region by 1991 
State Formation and Peace Negotiation 
The independence of the Republic of Somaliland was declared on May 18th 1991 in Buroc 
when the SNM met with the Somaliland Council of elders that was created a few years prior 
to this. There had been no plans of declaring independence at the outset of the civil war but 
some parts of the SNM and the elders seemed to be determined to make sure that the country 
would never suffer from the kind of destruction and repression that the Siyad Barre regime 
had been responsible for again (UNDP/EUE 1994). The unilateral declaration of a national 
government in the south formed by the United Somali Congress tipped the scale. The SNM 
was not consulted and neither were any of the other liberation movements. People gathered 
around the building where the meeting was held and demanded that the territory seceded 
from the rest of Somalia. Some of my informants seemed to be of the opinion that the 
declaration of independence was premature and that the meeting in Buroc was côuped by the 
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more radical segments of the SNM called the "Red Flags" and that the decision might not 
have been what all the participants wanted. 
The SNM over time developed into a multi clan organization (Fox 2000). The organization 
had a more democratic organizational structure than many other rebel organizations; they 
had regular elections for leader and the leadership rotated between the different clans. This 
did not prevent the conflicts that less than a year after secession started to destroy the 
country from within. Internal clan conflicts that resulted in internal civil wars occurred in 
1992-93 and in 1994-95. 
Fighting broke out in 1992 between two Isaaq clans in Buroc and spread to Sheikh and 
Berbera (Menkhaus 1999). Berbera is the only port in Somaliland and was the major source 
of revenue for the government and became the biggest bone of contention. Much of the 
fighting was over commercially valuable land in order to secure the groups chances of 
getting their share of the economic upsurge that stability had brought. The conflicts had both 
recent and historical origins. The infant nation was moving towards anarchy again over 
material causes. 
These developments lead to a long line of peace conferences held in all the major towns in 
Somaliland initiated by the clan elders (Menkhaus 1999).. The peace conferences in 
Somaliland in 1993 and in 1995 bore close resemblance to the traditional ways of solving 
conflicts among the Somalis. Elders with the confidence of their local communities met to 
resolve and reconcile the conflicting communities. 
The conferences were different from others held and sponsored by the international 
community (Menkhaus 1999).. The conferences of Somaliland received little or no 
international funding and they lasted for a longer period of time. They were also held inside 
of the country. The elders stressed the importance of giving the warring parties a chance to 
meet and discuss their problems but also give them the opportunity to let the hatred and 
anger cool down so that it would be possible to reach binding and agreed upon solutions. For 
the most part the meetings dealt with material issues; loss of private property and use of 
communal assets like grazing land and wells. In areas of mixed clan population security 
committees were created to oversee that the agreements reached were fulfilled and to 
monitor the development and go in and negotiate where peace and stability was threatened. 
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The smaller conferences gave regional settlements and culminated in a national conference 
in Borame from February to May 1993. 
The Constitutional System in Somaliland 
The first version of the constitution that was in place at the time of the field work was 
adopted in 1993 at the Borame peace conference (Lewis 2002).  A second version of the 
constitution was adopted by the national conference that was held in Hargeysa in 1997. This 
constitution was to function over a transitional period of three years and then be finally 
adopted after a national referendum was held. This transitional period was extended with a 
year in 1999 and another six months in February 2001. The referendum was held May 31st in 
2001 where the people voted yes to the constitution. There have been prior documents like 
the treaties signed with the British government by different Somaliland communities during 
colonial time to regulate the relations between the colonial parties and the Somali 
communities that outline rights and responsibilities. Before independence there were also 
different constitutional documents. After gaining independence in 1960 Somaliland did not 
adopt a constitution because they were working towards the unification of all the Somali 
territories. Their independence lasted for a few days before they were unified with the South, 
the former Italian protectorate. In a referendum in 1961 Somaliland rejected the constitution 
adopted by the new state of Somalia. 
The transitional structure of the Somaliland state was based on the common democratic 
principles of the separation of powers. They are to be further elaborated with Islamic law 
sharia. The state is organized into three branches. The parliament is the legislative branch of 
the state. It is divided into a House of Representatives and a House of Elders. There is a 
presidential executive power which consists of the president, the vice president and a council 
of ministers appointed by the president. Finally there is a judicial branch consisting of a 
supreme court, regional appeal courts, regional courts, district courts and the courts of the 
national armed forces. In addition there is a Procuracy with extended responsibilities that I 
will get back to later. 
The system at the time of my field work recognized the authority of the elders and the shir. 
The Guurti manifested the shir, the national assembly of elders selected by their 
communities that was incorporated in the constitution and became the upper chamber of the 
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legislative branch. They were responsible for safeguarding peace. All clans should be 
represented and according to perception of relative strength. The Guurti consists of 82 
members. Those in the house at the time of my research were elected as regional 
representatives but also as members of their own clan during peace negotiations in 1993. 
The members of the Guurti are elected as members of their clan and the distribution of the 
members is according to a key based on clan first and region second. They are elected for six 
years at a time. They further have to be older than 45 and they should have good knowledge 
of religion and be well versed in tradition. The traditional elder in the Somali community are 
often thought of as Men of Peace and they are either religious men or have other special 
skills like being good negotiators, poets or knowing the oral tradition of their clan well. 
These are the same qualities that are singled out in the constitutional system that is set up 
The foremost responsibility of the Guurti today is to uphold peace and security. 
Somaliland’s current stability was achieved largely through the initiative of traditional elders 
in the Somaliland community and they were also responsible for maintaining some sort of 
order in the chaos that the civil war brought upon the country. Another central responsibility 
is to review the laws passed by the House of Representatives before they are passed on to the 
president and they have special responsibilities regarding the passing of laws pertaining 
religion and culture. They may propose bills of their own and pass on to the House of 
Representatives but if it is not accepted there it cannot be referred back and then be voted 
over again at a later time. They have no say in bills that are related to finances but have 
considerable powers to delay the passing of other laws but no veto right as the House of 
Representatives do over bills coming from the Guurti. 
The House of Representatives is the “democratic” element in the set up and their number 
equals that in the House of elders, eighty-three. The members today were elected during the 
same process as the elders and according to clan. In the future it is supposed to be held 
democratic elections and the representatives will be elected as members of political parties. 
Their lowest education of the members of the House of Representatives should be secondary 
school and one is not allowed to hold other public office for this period of time. They are 
elected for five years and must be no less than thirty-five years. The house is in session for 
twenty-eight weeks a year and the same goes for the House of elders. 
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Their duties are amongst others to confirm appointments of ministers, head of organs and so 
on. They also ratify international agreements. They also debate and can refer back the 
governments program and suggest and recommend the political direction of the governments 
program. Any member of government must meet to explain their action if summoned by the 
house. They have control over financial legislation regarding taxes and duties for raising 
income, the establishment of income funds, currency regulations and regulation of the 
economic and financial system. They are responsible for the approval the national budget. 
The president can dissolve the House after the approval of a national referendum or for 
failing to hold session for two periods. It is not possible to dissolve the House during its first 
year of office or in the presidents last year of office. The same rules of dissolution apply to 
the House of Elders. 
The executive branch consists of the president, the vice-president and a council of ministers 
appointed by the president. The president and vice-president must be a Somaliland citizen by 
birth and cannot have another citizenship or be a refugee in another country. He must have 
lived in the country two years prior to the scheduled election and be aware of the country’s 
situation. He is required to be a Muslim and so is his spouse. Both are elected in direct 
election through secret ballot. The winner of the election is the candidate with most votes 
and the term of office is five years and can sit a maximum of two periods. The House of 
Elders is able to extend the term of the sitting president, which is five years if they find that 
the security situation in the country makes it difficult to carry out elections. If the president 
is unable to fulfill his duties during his office the Vice president takes his place for the rest 
of the term and has to elect a Vice President from the House of Representatives that the two 
houses has to confirm. The same happens if the vice president cannot fulfill his duties. In the 
case of both being unable to fulfill their duties the Speaker of the House of Elders assumes 
office and elections are to be held within sixty days. 
The president appoints the head of the different state organs like the Auditor General, 
Chairman of the central bank, chairman and committee members of the Civil Service 
Agency, commanders of the armed forces and their deputies, Chief Accountant and so on. 
He signs international agreements and treaties and participates in international conferences 
on behalf of The Republic of Somaliland, he appoints ambassadors to other countries and 
meat foreign diplomats. He may also proclaim state emergency. He also appoints ministers 
and the requirements for the ministers are the same as those for the House of Representative. 
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The president's appointment has to be approved by absolute majority (half of the total 
members plus one) by the House of Representatives. 
The judicial branch adjudicates proceedings between state organs and between members of 
the public. They interpret the laws and are responsible for the prosecution services of the 
country. They are supposed to be independent of the other branches. The judiciary consists 
in addition to the different courts of a special organ called the Procuracy and their task is to 
oversee civil suits on behalf of the government and inspect the prison system. The Attorney 
General is the head of this office and this is if one looks closer at it actually a part of the 
executive.  A special state organ that also should be mentioned is the Uleema that is a 
council consisting of Muslim scholars and they are responsible for overseeing that the laws 
passed are not in conflict with sharia and they formulate official declarations in cases of 
religious disputes. 
The country is divided in regions and these are divided into districts. They are to be 
administered through councils, region, districts and village, and that have power to plan their 
own economic and social affairs. The head of the region is to be appointed by the president 
and is the state's representative. These councils are in office for five years. The different 
regions of the country have rules for who can be the governor. The main rule is that a 
numerical dominant clan cannot have the highest political position. 
The constitution also address basic individual rights like the right to participate politically, 
economically, socially and culturally in the countries affairs. There is a freedom of 
movement and freedom of association unless it is seen as threatening to the state. There is no 
limitation period on violation on human rights such as torture, extra judicial killings and 
mutilation. Any arrest should be reasoned and the state should guarantee every citizens 
freedom. If arrested you are to be put in front of a court within forty eight hours.  One is 
innocent until proven guilty and only the offender is held liable to any crime. This is a very 
important clause since in the traditional system of xeer liability is often is distributed upon 
the diya paying group as a whole. Imprisonment is seen as a possibility for reform and 
rehabilitation. 
The constitutional system of Somaliland is rather straight forward and resembles systems all 
over the world. The system in play at the time of my field work differs a bit from what is laid 
down in the constitution. There are for instance not functional regional councils everywhere. 
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This is according to one respondent because there has not been held any elections yet. This 
means that more traditional structures of elders and sultans and aqils which are more 
hereditary titles come into play if conflicts arise. This means that there are ways of 
organizing in order to address central government if necessary as the new system hopefully 
moves toward maturity. 
The system is in its structure based on western liberal democracy; the representation is 
indirect and based on a fixed ratio between different clans with a consociational aim of 
integrating all elites and to reduce and solve conflicts. The system seeks to give all groups 
the right and possibility to participate in the reconstruction of Somaliland. The intention of 
the system is integration but the reality of the system might be something else. The mixing 
of xeer, sharia and more modern legal practices is quite complicated and admittedly leads to 
conflict as it is more modern legal practices that are given priority as such in the system but 
in times of conflict xeer has been used. Another issue is if this set-up is really able to counter 
the patrimonialistic political culture taking advantage of the clan structure that were 
basically institutionalized over the years beginning with the early colonization of the 
territory. Somalis have experienced several different ways of governing but none of them 
have been able to bring democracy and redistribution to the general population and it is 
questionable if the mere set-up in it self would be able to promote it now. Economic 
constraints have always structured the Somali state’s ability to integrate groups both 
horizontally and vertically and this is likely to continue.  
Concluding remarks 
In order to understand Somali politics and political formations after the collapse of Somalia 
in 1987 it is necessary to look at former political strategies in the Somali inhabited area. 
Political strategies over time can be said to create an environment for cooperation or conflict 
and political strategies after the state collapse can be seen as a continuation or a break with 
former politics. Politics are structured around common ideas and values and in addition the 
economic base of the state will determine to what degree the state succeeds in carrying out 
its policies. In Somalia nationalism has centered on the pan-Somali issue. The idea of a 
nation consisting of all the Somali speaking territories in the Horn of Africa can be said to 
have had a centripetal function in Somali politics since before independence. At the same 
 62 
time it seems clear that the social structure of Somalia where the clan is the main source of 
redistribution of wealth has had some problematic consequences over time. Given the 
dependent character of the Somali state clan affiliations have been politicized and used in 
order to gain access to positions and resources. The lack of ability of the state to develop the 
productive forces has exacerbated this tendency towards state centered patrimonialism. The 
result over time has been segmentation due to the mal functioning of the state. Somali 
scholars seem to have different opinions about the importance of clan as a centrifugal force 
in Somali politics. Ahmed Samatar’s analyses of Somali politics since before independence 
tones down the clan issue and puts more emphasis on general elite alliances and economic 
constraints. Lewis is amongst the traditionalist if it is possible to say that and gives clan 
affiliations and clan segmentation explanatory force. I choose to think that clan paired with 
economic dependency, regional political developments and Cold War rivalry that led to 
militarization actually does explain the disintegration of Somalia and that in any analyzes of 
the political strategies in Somalia the clan structure should be included. The consociational 
set up based on clan identities in Somaliland seeks to integrate both democratic and 
traditional elements in order to find a balance in political strategies that may promote 
stability and development and that have legitimacy in both the elite and the population.  
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Politics in Practice in Somaliland 
In this chapter I will try to answer my second research question. In what way are the 
political strategies of the Somaliland elite promoting stability and political integration? In 
the previous chapter I looked at political strategies over time and in this I will look at the 
strategies chosen by the elite in the transitional system at work at the time of my fieldwork 
in 2001. I will look at if the elite see the system as a good tool for influencing politics and 
also look at how they perceive their own performance and other branches of government’s 
performance. In this way I hope to be able to say something about whether the system is able 
to safeguard further stability, integrate the different groups and promote further 
reconstruction on all levels. I will also look at how civil society and the state are integrated 
and try to say something about the importance of group identity, namely clan in the 
relationship between civil society and state and in politics. 
  
Elite consociationalism within the state 
Here I will look at how the legislative and the executive talk about their own strategies and 
how they perceive their counterpart’s strategies. First I will look at the relationship between 
the executive and the legislative then the relationship within the legislative, between the 
Guurti and the House of Representatives 
The legislative and the executive branch 
The respondents from the legislative were pointing to the fact that they were not able to 
check the powers of the executive in general and the president in particular the way intended 
by the constitution (interview March 22nd, April 24th and April 21st). In that way they saw 
the major conflicts between the legislative branch and the executive branch as being 
constitutional. At the time of my fieldwork their main influence was in budget cases. If they 
did not approve the state budget it was impossible for the government to spend any money. 
They were also working on the amendments of the constitution in order to prepare for the 
Referendum that was held May 31st 2001 in order to get popular approval of the constitution 
and support for the Republic of Somaliland. 
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An example of this was that the constitution states that the government should prepare a 
political program each year that states what policies they are committed to and how they 
plan to carry them out. This political program had not been delivered in a formal document 
by the government. The president refused to do this and argued that his yearly speech to the 
people was sufficient (Interview April 24th).  This sentiment was not shared by parts of the 
House of Representative. The members of the House of Representatives that I interviewed 
considered this program very important (interview March 22nd, April 21st and April 24th). 
The president and his government were not elected on the basis of a political program which 
would be the case in a democratic system. They were nominated as members of clans and 
because they might have skills that were valued in a government position. The government’s 
politics was described as undecided and weak towards important questions like international 
recognition and economic and social development throughout the country (Interview March 
22nd, April 21st, April 24th). With no political program to hold the executive responsible for 
some representatives found it difficult to cooperate with them (Interview April 24th). 
Members of the executive on he other hand pointed to that many of the members of the 
House of Representatives were not qualified to do the job hence the conflicts that the 
legislative called constitutional and which the executive considered a result of that 
incompetence. The Representatives also saw the problem that some were not doing their job 
but maintained that there were competent and experienced representatives that had taken part 
in politics since the sixties and that this made it impossible to claim that dispute over the 
constitution were due to incompetence on behalf of the Representatives (Interview April 
21st, April 24th). 
When it came to the issue of a political program the House of Representatives had decided to 
accept the fact that the executive claimed that the yearly speech to the people was sufficient 
(Interview April 21st II, April 24th). They had no real leverage in order to make the president 
put forward a program. They still meant that it was unconstitutional behavior and not 
acceptable and the matter was debated both in the House of Representatives and the Guurti. 
They defended this strategy of no resistance by referring to the fact that they feared that a 
deep and open conflict could easily descend into the armed and dangerous conflicts they 
experienced in the early nineties (Interview April 21st II). It was also expressed that the 
system at the time was transitional and that meant that soon as a better system, the party 
system would be in place. 
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The set up with a bicameral system with a presidential executive and a clan based legislative 
intended to give the representatives a possibility to control the executive to quite some 
degree. This seemed not to be the case in Somaliland at the time of my fieldwork. The 
legislative chose a passive strategy of accepting what they saw as problematic lack of control 
with the politics of the executive. The executive on the other hand uses lack of experience in 
the legislative as their excuse to do things the way they see fit. The lack of putting forward a 
very detailed political program with more specified political goals made the executive 
flexible. To tie resources up in a program would make it hard to go in and negotiate when 
serious conflicts came around. No doubt the system depended on the fact that one was able 
to handle conflicts both by negotiation and in a more material way. In order to reach a 
settlement a material concession was assumed to be given too. The fact that all the 
representatives were nominated on basis of clan and were assumed to represent local 
communities did not seem to make the critique put forward by the representatives more 
legitimate or more important to address by the executive. By not allowing the legislative to 
influence their practice they were jeopardizing stability over time as the legislative had an 
important legitimizing function. Both branches of government seemed to know that their 
strategies were acceptable to a certain degree also because the system was considered 
transitional and that another system, hopefully better would be in place in a few years. This 
shows that the elite integration is considerable and enough to give predictability within the 
system but the disputes over how the constitution is to be interpreted and the fact that the 
legislative are unable to check the executive in the way prescribed by the constitution could 
be a future problem.  
In order to create a more stable economic environment a new currency, the Somaliland 
shilling had been introduced during the presidency of the now late Ibrahim Egal (interview 
March 22nd). This was seen by the legislative as a good accomplishment. The Somali shilling 
had lost much of its value due to decades of war. It has been common practice that 
businessmen and head of militias got their own bills printed abroad. This had made the 
inflation high in the parts of the country where this currency was used. In the area that the 
Somaliland shilling had been introduced and the Somali shilling was taken out of circulation 
the inflation was fairly low. One problem pointed out by my respondents was that not the 
whole of Somaliland had switched to the Somaliland Shilling even though the use of the 
Somali Shilling was forbidden by law. The reason for not changing their money was 
apparently that they would have to bring their Somali shilling in exchange and they would 
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not get the total value of their money back in Somaliland Shilling. The government had tried 
to set an official exchange rate but this had not worked out. There are no banks in 
Somaliland only various firms which are active in a multitude of business areas like the 
Hawala banking system, soft drinks and telecommunications. Most of these businesses do 
their transaction in US dollars. Their customers take the dollars to the money exchangers on 
the corner for Somaliland Shilling and they get a better rate from them than the rate that the 
state has set. There were incidents were these money exchangers were arrested by the police 
for not following the official exchange rates but they were only gone for a limited period of 
time and continued their business when released. The state simply did not have the resources 
to control the money market or to make Somaliland Shilling the valid currency in all its 
territory.  
Introducing a common currency was meant to have a stabilizing effect on the economy. The 
introduction of the Somaliland Shilling had made it possible to have a better control than if 
one had continued to use the Somali Shilling that was heavily influenced by the continuous 
fighting in the south and the lack of any state authority that could regulate inflation through 
various economic tools and where the private printing of bills still was a problem. 
Monopolizing the printing of bill and issuing a separate bill for Somaliland both gave 
promises of a more stable market and created a sense of common identity. The heavy 
inflation associated with the Somali shilling had not occurred in Somaliland giving 
economic predictability to both businesses and people in general and thus promoting 
stability. 
The government had also been able to disarm the militia groups of the country to a large 
extent. Those who used to be members of a militia group during the civil war could register 
to become a soldier or policeman (interview March 22nd, April 24th). They had to bring all 
their weapons and were trained by the government. According to some of my respondents 
and other people that I talked to during my stay the situation was different in different parts 
of Somaliland. The problem of militias creating check points at important roads and 
demanding money from travelers was probably not a problem in Somaliland any more. But 
many claimed that the presence of weapon in the streets still was a problem in some areas. 
Walking in the streets in the capital of Hargeysa you would only see the police or the 
president’s security force carry weapon. During my three month stay I only heard a gun fired 
once and that was the police firing after a car after a hit and run incident. In downtown 
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Hargeysa the money exchangers would sit along the street with their Somaliland Shillings on 
the table ready to change US dollars and other regional currencies for you. They sat perfectly 
safe and you never heard of robberies. In e.g. Buroc one could still see technicals in the 
streets which were rebuilt cars designed to carry bigger firearms (interview April 6th) and 
there were reports of shooting between different groups when conflicts occurred. 
Being able to absorb the militias is without doubt important in order to maintain stability. 
Historically Somalia was one of the most militarized countries in the world due to fierce 
Cold War competition during the whole post-colonial period. It was the degree of weapons 
available that partly contributed to the devastating effects of the state collapse. The claims 
and grievances put forward have been pushed by gun force and not peaceful means. In order 
for a state to be able to function and be legitimate in the sense that they can offer its citizens 
an acceptable degree of security, there is a need to monopolize the use of violence and being 
able to enforce law and order. In Somaliland one had achieved the goal, at least in the 
western part of the country and partly in the east. The degree of gun control in Somaliland 
seemed to be sufficient in order to be able to make the state’s army and police force able to 
provide a degree of security that prevented and discouraged groups from forming militias 
and paramilitary organizations. The rehabilitation of militiamen was the only strategy for 
creating job opportunities for people in Somaliland. This effort was considered by many to 
be closely related to the enduring stability and it gave legitimacy to the executive. 
What is clear is that Somaliland is vulnerable both to internal and external changes in 
political environment and this relative gun control would easily crumble in the wake of a 
conflict either with bordering areas within the former Somalia or conflicts with neighboring 
states, first and foremost Ethiopia. Another destabilizing factor could be the heightened fear 
of terrorism and the fact that the whole territory of Somalia is seen as a likely breeding 
ground for Islamic terrorist groups. Many informants that I talked to described of how the 
hardships brought upon the population through the successive conflicts from state collapse 
and to the time of my fieldwork also resulted in a radicalization of both religious and 
political groups but also a move in the population towards a more strict interpretation of 
religion and religious practice. The Somalis interpretation of Islam has been modified by the 
pastoral culture in the past and the carrying of full length hijabs were a recent phenomenon 
observed after the collapse of Somalia. Adherence to a much stricter way to interpret Islam 
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was a recent phenomenon too. International military intervention as a result of this will 
undoubtedly have serious implications for the areas that would be targeted. 
There had been no other programs on the part of the government in order to create jobs. 
Unemployment in Somaliland was very high. No numbers of the magnitude of the problem 
existed but that more than half the adult male population was out of work is probably fair to 
say. The Representatives brought this up as a major area that the government had showed 
little interest for or will to do something about. It has been a problem of earlier regimes that 
they had not been able to satisfactory create work opportunities that people benefited from 
and that increases productivity. This was especially one of the goals of the early Barre 
regime. What was achieved was either not working or it had biases towards geographical 
areas like the southern part of Somalia or an urban or even clan bias. It is unquestionable 
that the main source of income, export of livestock was not able to absorb the entire work 
force. The economy of the state was not of a magnitude that allowed them to go into this 
area and stimulate to the establishing of work opportunities. Urbanization is on the increase 
all over Africa and also in Somaliland. There is a large urban population that is unable to 
find work and thus be able to sustain themselves and their families. In Somaliland people are 
left to create their own work opportunities. 
Both members of the House of Representatives and members of the executive branch were 
all aware of the problem of uneven development. Whereas the representatives saw this as a 
conscious strategy of negligence from the government’s side the members of the executive 
accounted for it by pointing to lack of funding because of the lack of international 
recognition of the country which made it harder for them to control the activity of NGOs in 
the country since they were not seen as a formal state authority and proper bilateral partner 
by some actors (WSP International Somali Program 2005). The amputated income due to a 
long lasting ban on export of livestock also made the financial situation of the government 
difficult. 
All of the Representatives pointed out that there was a problem of uneven allocation of 
funding by the state. The representative for one of the eastern regions said that the 
government was present to a very little degree in his region. The government spent little 
money and even contributed to the low share of international NGOs in the area. Up to 2001 
the government had not discouraged NGOs to operate in the eastern part of Somaliland but 
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had stated that they could not take responsibility for people’s security east of a certain area. 
A couple of representatives said that this had contributed to the uneven distribution of NGO 
projects in Somaliland. These NGO projects were vital in order to provide basic 
infrastructure as health care, schools and water in Somaliland. The area he comes from is 
partly disputed. The bordering territory of Puntland claims part of the Sool and Sanaag 
region. Because the state did not show commitment to the people of the region it was 
difficult to get an accurate picture of their support for a Somaliland state. People were not 
blind to the fact that they received less economic benefits than the central western areas. 
This resulted in e.g. very few schools in the eastern region. In this way the government was 
upholding a possible destabilizing factor. Because of the weak presence of the government 
one Representative said that the people of these regions were not giving their full support to 
a Somaliland state (Interview April 21st II).  
Both the issue of unemployment and uneven development points to something that has to be 
taken seriously in terms of lasting stability. Somaliland’s lack of recognition by the outside 
world makes them extremely vulnerable as they have little control over their economy. 
Development projects will as much be the result of what the outside world wants to sponsor 
and maybe less of needs put forward by the executive. Somaliland needs to create an 
environment of stability and trust on all levels in order to be able to make it as a state. The 
fact that some of the territory is disputed because the clans that live their also live in 
bordering territories in the former Somalia makes it even more important to be able to 
control the distribution of for instance important infrastructure in a just way that is seen to 
benefit the whole country, not only the core area, the western part which is also considered 
to be Isaaq land, the largest clan in Somaliland. It will also be crucial to be able to stimulate 
economic activity in the more remote areas in order for these areas to be integrated in the 
economy of Somaliland. This will prove to be crucial over time. With no strengthening of 
the links between the center and the periphery within Somaliland the conflicts will start to 
bud as they are more vulnerable to pressure from the outside. Today that pressure comes 
from Puntland that claims parts of both Sanaag and Sool. The population in the areas is 
holding back their loyalty in order to see what will benefit them more, being a part of 
Somaliland that aims at being an independent state and Puntland that is waiting for Somalia 
to stabilize in order to reenter. Today these conflicts demand military resources diverting 
attention from the most important task, that improvement of both social and physical 
infrastructure and integration in a non-conflict way is the only way to secure stability and 
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loyalty to the Somaliland state over time. Still the Somaliland state has legitimacy and 
support in the population in the fact that they have been able to provide effective protection 
from violence and to withstand security provisions from the outside, e. g. through the United 
Nations (UN) giving a sense of self-reliance (Brons 2001) 
Being in the executive was seen as a difficult job. The salary for a minister was around US$ 
400 a month (April 21st 2001). A minister pointed to the fact that the most competent for the 
challenging top jobs were abroad or they were working for international NGOs like the UN. 
The low pay was not encouraging Somalis with higher education to return to the country. 
There was always the problem of clan. Occasionally there would be accusation of one clan 
getting the favorable positions in the system. Because of this when someone had to leave 
their position one had to try to be sure that the replacement did not create any imbalance in 
the clan balance because this could eventually create conflict. When hiring in the 
bureaucracy it was claimed that the process was open to the public and that people were 
hired after merits. In this way they hoped that they could avoid accusations of tribalism. The 
representatives on the other hand were quite sure that the hiring process was biased towards 
some groups and that the openness of the process could be questioned (interview April 24th). 
Civil society permeates the state in this way to a large degree in Africa. This is explained 
with the fact that the state is one of few arenas to secure a living and maintain one’s 
networks through patrimonial distribution of spoils. The salaries in an infant state like 
Somaliland were not inflated but they certainly amounted to a lot more than what ordinary 
people taking jobs could expect to get. Brain drain has been a feature of Somaliland for a 
long time. The post-independence period probably contributed to most of it as Somaliland 
quite fast became a province due to the heavy centralization of both the state and 
development strategies that benefited the south over the north, the urban areas over the rural 
and in some periods also agriculture over animal husbandry. The salaries were in that sense 
to low to attract well educated and competent people for abroad. A lot of politicians and 
ministers did have private interests in business too. Some explained that this was necessary 
in order to make a good living. This meant that they had links and connections that by the 
public and the media were seen as problematic because it was believed that they would 
protect their private economic interests at all times and that might conflict with the general 
interest of the public. It was also seen as more beneficial to do business in Somaliland than 
taking office since the latter paid less.  
 71
Even though the strong links between different elite segments does not benefit the people of 
Somaliland as much as one could hope for when it comes to economic development these 
links are probably an important factor that makes it possible to avoid bigger conflicts and 
makes the will to negotiate and achieve compromises rather as the elite has the most 
economic gain from stability. In order for the Somaliland state to succeed they will have to 
find strategies that are more beneficial in regard of social redistribution within the whole 
population than what they have today. The set-up is beneficial in that it promotes strong 
horizontal elite integration and the consociational elements are there to quite some degree 
and this in turn is promoting stability and room for some reconstruction processes to take 
place. 
Guurti and the House of Representatives. 
The representative’s job was seen as very challenging. The Somalis are used to a central 
government (Interview April 21st II.) They are used to representatives that most of all 
represent them selves, their clan or the government, not the area they come from. Most 
people did not know the function of the representatives and it was also a problem that some 
of the representatives were not doing their job properly according to some respondents. It 
was unusual for the representatives to be approached by groups from his area that wanted to 
discuss political matters (Interview April 24th.) Most of the time people came in order to get 
a favor. They would for instance ask if the representative could try to get them a job by 
telling someone in the administration about them. This was explained with the fact that they 
were not elected directly by the people. The representatives were suggested as candidates by 
sultans and aqils. This meant that some of them probably were chosen from the personal 
interests of those nominating them and not on the basis of skill (interview April 21st II). The 
representative might be more concerned about satisfying the needs of the one who got him in 
than thinking of the best of the country. One of the representatives believed that the 
clansmen of a representative would back him no matter what he did (interview March 22nd). 
The Executive found that it had fewer conflicts with the Guurti than the House of 
Representatives (interview April 21st I). Members of the House of Representatives explained 
this in different terms. They felt that the members of the Guurti were less competent in the 
functioning of a modern state and politics (interview April 24th I). They were often illiterate, 
they were not able to consider all the facts important in a case and debate them properly. 
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Another representative said that many of them had gotten their seats in the Guurti because 
the president wanted them. He claimed that money were used to bribe people in the 
nominating process in order to keep critical voices out of the system and get those loyal to 
the president in (interview March 22nd). In this way the most critical voices of the traditional 
elite were not heard and the House of Representatives came across as more critical and 
difficult to cooperate with. 
The set up and basis for the system is rather clear. Because elections were not held the clans 
got their share in influence through seats in the parliament and holding office. What seems to 
have been given little thought was that even though there have been state structures in 
Somaliland since long before independence most people have little knowledge or 
understanding of how they work and how to have influence in a more democratic way. The 
representatives of the House undoubtedly had the hardest time coping with this hybrid 
construction as they were neither elders nor democratically elected representatives and even 
though their task was clear and their mandate was clearly stated in the constitution they 
probably had the weakest position in the system.  
The members of the Guurti seemed less focused on the conflicts. They were quite clear on 
what were their task in the system. They were supposed to uphold the peace and felt that 
they had managed very well (interview February 25th I). They were not critical of the 
government spending and pointed to the limited resource base for explanations. They 
described it as unproblematic to keep in touch with their electorate, the clan and area they 
came from (interview April 13th I and II). Between sessions they would travel home and 
have talks with the different clans about what needed to be done and they would make sure 
to push the case when back in session (interview April 13th II). 
No doubt the function of the members of the Guurti was much clearer than that of other 
representatives. They were given limited powers through the constitutions but the ones they 
were given they seemed to be able to solve in a way they found satisfactory. Major conflicts 
had been avoided ever since the last civil war and the Guurti was part of the prescription. 
What is on the other hand clear is that the rest of the representatives did not have much trust 
in the Guurti members as being independent and not in the pocket of the executive. So even 
though stability seemed to be achieved there seemed to be a lot of distrust within the system 
due to assumed and actual patrimonialistic practices by the executive in order to keep 
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conflicts off the table. Either as a result of a poor understanding of how the system was 
supposed to work but also because little thought was given to what kind of pressure would 
be put on the traditional system and its leaders from the state in general and maybe the the 
executive in particular. 
State/Civil Society Relations and possible channels of 
representation 
In this part I will look at the relative importance of clan in general in Somaliland today and 
in politics in particular. I will also look at to what degree the state is able to promote vertical 
integration between state/civil society by their political strategies. 
The Importance of Clan 
My experience during my fieldwork was that clan is important to Somalis. When I got 
interviews my contacts would always be able to place my respondents in the Somali lineage 
system. Discussing politics they would always discuss it along clan lines especially when 
talking about the Siyad Barre regime. There are some negative abusive words used in 
Somaliland that refers to actual sub clans. Meeting my respondents some of them would 
already have heard about me and they would immediately place me in my husbands sub clan 
as the white Muuse Abdalleh woman. We were quickly placed within the greater clan 
system. I very soon learned that my husband belonged to the Garxajiis clan that is a sub clan 
of the Habar Yunis who are of the Isaaq clan, the Isaaq being the majority in Somaliland. 
When Somalis from the Diasporas returns to their family back in Somaliland the 
expectations are high. The Somalis have few sources of income and many depend on their 
relatives abroad to survive. The first few weeks we had visitors all the time. They all came to 
greet the member of the family who was visiting from Europe, my husband. They all left 
with a bundle of Somali shillings in their hand. When I asked who these people were, the 
answer was that they were all the descendants of Wacays Alaleh Cilmi, my husband’s great 
grand father. It was unquestionable that they all were entitled to have a share in our assumed 
wealth. In addition to his family his friends from high school also came by regularly and 
walked out with a little something. 
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During my visit there was a dispute over some property. The argument was between a 
relative of my husband and someone else. The men of the family immediately dropped what 
they were doing and went to the plot in order to settle things. Taking care of the registering 
of a land plot in my husbands name also entailed getting a man of his own clan to help them 
out at the land office. They spent two whole days in line at the office to get the papers 
registered. Everyone ensured that this was the best and quickest way. 
We did not have a refrigerator in the house. Some of the stores around in the neighborhood 
did. My husband’s brother suggested that we ask one of them to keep some food in their 
fridge. They would probably do it, because the owner of the store was married to “one of our 
girls”, which meant a Muuse Abdalleh woman. 
The paying of diya is also common. This is a major legal problem for the state and has by 
many writers been described as the major illness of the clan system. If one considers the case 
of murder the problem is twofold. In traditional Somali Xeer the defendant’s clan pays the 
victim’s clan diya which can be translated into blood money. The clan has to pay an agreed 
upon amount of livestock, preferably camels to compensate the other clans loss of life. The 
“prize” of a man was traditionally higher than that of a woman or child. Today hard currency 
like US dollars is common too. If diya is not paid there seems to be common acceptance for 
retribution. The person responsible for the murder risks being killed by the other clan. If he 
cannot be found someone else in the clan risks being murdered. This can be the beginning of 
a bitter and bloody conflict with innocents loosing their lives. When the formal legal system 
of Somaliland functions the offender is brought to trial and is sent to prison. In many 
instances the clan avoids paying diya. The defendant often experiences that he is never safe 
even though he has served his sentence. The clan of his victim will still seek compensation 
through diya and if they cannot get it the life of the murderer is second on the list. Another 
scenario is that murderers are not brought to the courts. The clans come to an agreement 
amongst them and pay diya. The clan takes collective responsibility for the crime committed 
by one man. If the police try to investigate the murder they will most likely not get any 
information on the murder from either clan.  
You do encountered most of the relationships that are described in the literature and 
especially by Lewis. Because of the situation in Somaliland with few employment 
opportunities especially for men and the fact that social services like child care, hospitals 
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and dentist are paid services where most people rely on wealthier relatives or someone in the 
Diasporas to cover expenses for health care or even basic foodstuff. You will be obliged to 
help the paternal side of the family, but it will also be expected that you help your immediate 
maternal family. It is very common at least in certain clans with intermarriage so the 
economic responsibility crosses clan identity. 
The Clan Issue in Somaliland Politics 
When my informants were asked about the importance of clan in today’s politics they 
seemed to agree on one thing. Clan politics was a problem of the past. This I took to mean 
that politics today did not involve the kind of political manipulation of clan identity in order 
to dominate other groups as described in earlier political analysis. The members of the 
Guurti described clan as part of their culture and a building block for a new system but not 
suitable for the system of a modern state (interview February 25th I, April 13th I and II) One 
of the Representatives described it as something truly bad that conflicts with Islam. He 
accepted that the clan structure was the only basis for building up the new system. He still 
thought that by educating the people they would learn to think differently. The clan structure 
of society made people distrust members of other clans and this made cooperation ad 
development difficult. He thought that the government should have taken the responsibility 
in educating people so that they could see other ways of organizing themselves than along 
tribal lines (interview April 24th I). The previous misuse of clan identities by the former 
regime seemed to make most of them convinced that a transition to a more democratic form 
of government was necessary. They all pointed out that the political system was not good 
enough before every one in the country could cast a vote. They also believed that a system 
with political parties would ease the strain on the clan system and make conflict along clan 
identities less frequent. This was because the law stated that a party needed to have members 
from all over the country in order to be legal. It could not have a regional or a clan base. The 
system should only allow for three parties to run for the final elections so that clan friction 
could be further diminished. This would make the integration of different groups even more 
certain. 
When my respondents were talking about politics and clan they all were of the opinion that 
clan was a destructive force at least seen in historically terms. There was also widespread 
agreement that it offered the only basis for getting a stable political system to work. Most of 
my respondents either in the system or outside seemed to look upon democracy and tribalism 
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as diametrically opposite ways of doing politics. Still everybody talked about justice for all 
clans, representation for all clans and influence for all clans. 
Thinking of clan as a political problem has been the common and public view since before 
independence. The only problem of looking at it this way is that it totally ignores or at least 
tries to ignore the fact that clan is one of the only functioning structures for social 
redistribution in Somaliland today. For instance there is no collection of for instance zakaat 
in Somaliland; it is left to people them selves to decide who their zakaat should go to (WSP 
International Somali Program 2005). Most of the time zakaat is given to relatives something 
that is possible as long as they qualify for receiving zakaat. There barely exists free public 
services in Somaliland which makes most people depend on economic support from their 
relatives in order to get e.g. medical treatment. This support is commonly retrieved from 
more wealthy relatives in their close family or from relatives abroad.  
The limited resources of the state and the prior conflicts and their solution has shown that 
the clan system has been crucial in order to obtain stability and to be able to get started with 
the task of rehabilitating both social, economic and political infrastructure in Somaliland. 
Politics in Somaliland at the time of the fieldwork was expressed in terms of distribution of 
clan influence and depended on a conception of equity among clans. There seemed to be 
little dispute over the number of representatives that each group had gotten during the peace 
processes within the system itself. Each clan had gotten a certain number and they had 
negotiated the further division between the sub clans amongst themselves. On informant 
claimed that everyone of course wanted more influence through more representatives 
(interview February 27th). He considered this quite common in politics but said that the seats 
given to each clan was respected by all groups. Only once had there been a change of 
numbers and that had been within the Isaaq clan. I learned through informal conversations 
with some of my contacts in Hargeysa that even the groups that are not considered Somalis 
and that were socially segregated from the Somalis were represented in all organs. When 
conflicts arose they seemed to be solved within the clan system but that did not necessarily 
mean that it was solved within the political system. 
The big question is how to actually handle the fact that this has been the major structure of 
political mobilization since colonial time and find a suitable and acceptable way to integrate 
it into the modern day political formations? The clan system is by many people perceived as 
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a static structure that does not change much over time. This is an old fashioned way of 
seeing this kind of social construction. The clan system is as prone to change as any other 
networks and has changed a lot under the influence of changing political, economic and 
social circumstances. The development of the clan structure into a network readily available 
to promote singular interests on the top has been a consequence of first and foremost the lack 
of sustainable economic development. The latter is unfortunately a stable trend and this 
makes it crucial to look at how this tendency towards clientelistic networks could be 
countered. The system as such does not rid Somali politics of this. I believe the clan 
structure is a living and developing structure and its vitality is proved in how it has in fact 
been able to contain conflicts in Somaliland but there is a need to actively go in and 
negotiate how the negative consequences of this structure is supposed to be countered, not 
only by the state but by civil society, the clans themselves. The clans are still tools in the 
hands of the elite and this has to change in order for a more positive development to take 
place both in politics and in society in general. Civil society is not able to participate in the 
structuring of  politics even though the clan structure in theory would make this possible and 
this is the problem that was never solved, how do we promote real participation from below? 
The legislative and civil society 
The people I talked to that were not formally in the system had different opinions upon the 
functioning of the legislative. The general sentiment was that they were skeptical to what 
degree in which the elected representatives could be said to represent the community. A 
major objection was that the processes giving the representatives were not in any 
circumstances democratic (Interview April 6th respondent I and II). Respondent I thought 
that the whole process was tainted and that the representatives had no legitimacy in the 
population:  
“For example, the guy that represents us in the parliament was not elected by us. He 
was put there by an elder.” (Interview April 6th respondent I) 
He believed that the process had not at any time included large segments of the population 
and that Egal prepared the election of the parliament. He also claimed that people had little 
faith in their representatives. Respondent II was not that critical. He felt that his 
representative in the Guurti did a good job. He was in touch with the community and 
brought members from the community with him in order for them to address the group’s 
grievances. 
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This was a reoccurring theme with all respondents whether in the system or outside. Were 
the state adhering to democratic principles or as it seemed, were they prone to patrimonial 
distribution of power and spoils highly associated with former state structures? The naturally 
following worry would of course be if the clan structure yet again was being susceptible for 
manipulation by segments that wanted to monopolize power and in that way over time cause 
political disintegration. Another observation that was also realized within the system was the 
fact that it did not seem like every one did their best in following up their community either 
because they lacked legitimacy within their respective communities or because they did not 
have a clear idea of how to go about the task of being a representative. A problem that is 
stated by Lijphart himself is the fact that when one is dealing with a system that integrates 
elite form different groups the processes might lack transparency. In Somaliland there has 
also been a change over the years where elites are becoming urban dwellers and still 
represent the rural communities they come from. To some this has meant a modernization of 
the elite segments that was thought necessary when being a representative in a modern 
political system and to some this meant that the rural part of the clan lost some of their 
influence. What at least seems probable is that the elites that are within the system would 
build more trust if the processes they entered were more open to the public and the 
settlements reached open to public scrutiny. 
Another objection to the legislative was related to the number of representatives designated 
to each group (Interview April 6th respondent I). One way of determining a clan's size has 
been to look at the number of names. The Somalis trace their lineage through their name and 
those with the most paternal ancestors in their name are considered the biggest. This is the 
traditional way of determining a clan's strength and not a very scientific method and it is not 
proven to be accurate. As an example he used the Isaaq clan where he belonged to a sub 
clan. The Isaaq clan was split into eight major clans and these got an equal share of seats in 
both the House of Representatives and the Guurti. This did not reflect the fact that these 
groups were different in actual size. The civil war in 1993 was the result of discontent within 
the Isaaq. The Garxajiis sub clan and the Habar Yunis in particular were alienated by the 
system and he thought that the unfair distribution of seats and power within his clan was a 
cause.  
Somaliland was suffering from the fact that no census has been done for years and all 
calculations upon both the size of the population and the actual size of a clan were estimates 
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or the traditional way of assessing a clan’s size had been used. There seemed to be a general 
conception within the smaller clans losing to the bigger both within the majority clan of the 
Isaaq and other clans towards the Isaaq. Consequently there were grievances put forward on 
behalf of the smaller clans. This was not necessarily seen as a threat to the system but a way 
of getting focus on the issues. This seemed to be a challenge to the transitional structure, 
how to be able to make sure that all the groups felt that they had real influence.  This is 
probably the most common problem in a structure where power sharing between groups is 
the basis for the functioning of the state. In Somaliland there is no problem in identifying the 
group but their size is unknown. Neither did the constitution try to protect the smaller groups 
with giving them the right to for instance veto decisions they felt would be harmful to their 
group. Everyone was represented and their leverage would be according to actual strength 
like in representation or access to resources. 
Another of my respondents who had participated as an observer in the Hargeysa meeting in 
1997 also claimed that the representatives were not representing the community because 
they had not participated in an election (interview April 18th No III). The reconciliation 
process is often said to have been traditional and following old principles of community 
participation (Lewis and Farah?). He denies that it was as does other respondents (interview 
April 26th No II, April 6th respondent I). He says that the traditional system was good but 
that the latest processes were not according to this. He called it clan-based representation 
and he seems to understand it as negative and related to the former politics of the Siyad 
Barre regime. 
The Somalis traditional way of organizing was decentralized and there was no central 
authority to sanction decisions made on inter or intra clan level. The state is a rather new 
invention in the Somalis way of organizing politically and it has displayed characteristics 
quite different from the traditional system. The state apparatus both during colonialism, the 
post independent democratic period and the dictatorship of Siyad Barre can all correctly be 
described as centralized. The centralizing tendency accelerated even more towards the state 
collapse. Over the last fifty years the central authorities have not been checked from below 
by an electorate in the same ways as in e.g. a Western democracy. The transitional system I 
looked at had the same problem. The educated and privileged elite have monopolized power 
and have over time accommodated new elite segments in order to sustain power. Staying in 
power has also meant being able to secure support from both traditional networks like the 
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clan and within the elite itself. The support from the traditional network seems to be secured 
by the mere notion of the value of having someone within the state system. The value of a 
network in itself is considered high even though the gain from it may vary considerable over 
time. The reconciliation processes did in fact include elements that were not traditional. In 
the reports that have been made this is seen as a sign of the ability to change practice as the 
circumstances change. But taking into account that large parts of the population still live 
outside the bigger towns the process came a cross as less democratic in the sense that it 
actually was seen as a purely elite process and rather urban based and with an anchoring in 
old elites formed during and fed by the earlier regimes which did not have the trust of the 
people. 
There were different approaches to why a clan-based system was not a good solution but 
merely means to an end that is democracy in some form. One respondent said that the clan 
system conflicted with the Somalis religion Islam (interview April 18th No III) Very few, he 
included, had little to gain from the clan system. He even suggested that poorer people that 
often rely heavily on their clan for survival were willing to abandon this structure. Others 
rejected it on a strict basis of not being representative. They believed that as many as 
possible of the population should be involved in the election of their representatives and this 
criterion was not fulfilled at all (interview April 6th respondent I and II). The challenge that 
is surfacing here is how are one supposed to handle the changes that have occurred over the 
years in the clan system that was the basis of the system. There is evidence that suggests that 
even though the clan and the family is the basic unit of organizing both socially and 
politically the functioning of it has in some people’s opinion been perverted. That even the 
man in the street uses the system in order to satisfy personal needs and that the collective 
thinking that once was the corner stone and a prerequisite for peaceful interaction and 
redistribution has been compromised both by the former regimes manipulating of the system 
and the war that has broken down family values.  
My findings show that not all clans feel that they have a voice within the system and that the 
perception still is that the elite has its own agenda and still will and can mobilize through 
their clan. Clan permeates society and the Somali state’s history works against clan as a 
political building bloc. There is little trust in some parts of society in the ability of the elite 
to be willing to integrate civil society in the state structure in order to promote real influence 
from below on politics. Still it is naive like some critics claim that most people are willing to 
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abandon the clan system if they could have a more democratic state and government. As 
long as most Somalis depend on economic help from the Diaspora and this comes through 
their family networks is not likely that anyone would actually renounce it. Especially for the 
poor where there are little employment possibilities a democratic system without a healthy 
economy to provide for basic needs like health care, schooling and clean water is an 
unthinkable option.  
The Executive and Civil society 
Most of my respondent that were not integrated in the system already expressed deep 
suspicion towards the presidency and the accomplishments of the sitting government. They 
were critical to the president in particular. The president at the time was Ibrahim Egal. He 
was the prime minister in Somalia’s last civilian government before the Siyad Barre regime. 
Two of my respondents believed that the president was misusing public funds in private 
spending (interview April 6th respondent I and II). “This is a one man show. Egal is the 
ultimate decision maker!” (Interview April 6th respondent I). It was common knowledge that 
the president would dismiss any member of government if he disliked what he did. He would 
contact the elders of the minister’s clan and ask them to replace him. I learned during my 
fieldwork that there was a high turnover in prestigious positions like ministers and mayors of 
the major towns of Berbera and Hargeysa. People talked about it but none of the respondents 
within the system mentioned it. When I was in Hargeysa the president established a 
committee that would look into the problem of corruption. He first targeted former ministers 
and employees that had gotten their houses subsidized because of their government 
employment. The mayor of Hargeysa was arrested as was his predecessor and a former 
mayor of Berbera was also wanted but was not in the country at the time of the others arrest. 
They were all accused of embezzlement of public funds (The Republican April 28th 2001). 
The Mayor of Hargeysa was reinstated a few months later and freed of all charges. The 
Republican questioned the fact that the researchers did not sweep their own front step, the 
government, before lashing out at others. They assumed that the committee was merely a 
tool in order to intimidate political opponents as free elections and the party system was 
scheduled to take place within that year. The president was desperate for support and would 
do what it took to get another term. Either by asking the parliament for a new term and a 
further postponement of the elections or by making sure that his party was able to get 
enough support to qualify to run for the elections. 
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Another of my respondents joined in with the opinion of a member of the House of 
Representatives (interview March 22nd, April 18th III) He was very critical to the government 
spending and claimed that it was not correct to talk about government spending in relation to 
rehabilitation of schools, water supplies and health care.  
“Believe me. You will not find in this city or any other place any project that the 
government is responsible or. […] They will take you to any project; it must have 
been funded by the UN agencies here or European Union (EU) donor project.” 
(interview March 22nd, April 18th III) 
Moving around in Hargeysa and on a trip to the mountain village of Sheik and the port of 
Berbera this was also fairly obvious to me. The road between Berbera and Hargeysa was 
rehabilitated with funding from the EU. In Sheik they were rehabilitating the secondary 
school with money from a German organization-SOS. The improvement of the port in 
Berbera has been facilitated by EU funds and I also met a representative for DANIDA when 
visiting the port facilities. They were looking into funding further rehabilitation of the port. 
All of my respondents who were outside of the political system talked about the fact that 
development were a privilege of the western parts of Somaliland (interview March 17th, 
April 6th and April 18th III). My respondents were all living in Hargeysa but were critical to 
the lack of both projects and government agencies in parts of the country. One respondent 
questioned the entire existence of a Somaliland state because of this. The government had 
not provided the communities with services like free schooling. If you got sick and went to 
the hospital you would be told to get a prescription from the pharmacy and the necessary 
equipment to administer it. If there were services at all you would have to pay. My 
experience was that most ordinary Somalis were not able to pay for these things and 
depended on family or friends in order to borrow the money they needed to get medical 
treatment and often family abroad. In Hargeysa everything could be bought for money, but 
in many other parts people were left to themselves. 
The president’s lack of commitment to getting Somaliland recognized by the international 
community was brought up by all respondents. The fact that he on some occasions said he 
was ready to engage in talks with the south as soon as they had a government that 
represented the community seemed to have been very provoking. When he agreed to see a 
UN representative who was believed by the Republican and the House of Representatives to 
give a negative portrayal of the situation in Somaliland to his organization it was commented 
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by the media several times. In my interviews all the different opinions upon what a Somali 
state should constitute surfaced. My two respondents in the interview April 6th disagreed to 
whether Somaliland actually was a state or not but agreed that recognition was a must in 
order to get a government that was strong enough to instigate development to the whole 
country. 
The respondents were all under the impression that some clans were favored by the 
government and the system in general. The president’s clan was assumed to have 
prominence over other clans. There were claims of a hiring practice that favored the Habar 
Awal which was the clan of the sitting president (interview April 18th). This is a returning 
problem through out the history of the Somalis in general.  
As my analyses shows, the problem of clan seems to persist in the new system. There seems 
to be few ways of changing the patrimonialistic way these networks have functioned and 
developed and the evidence seems to be in the conceived lack of development discriminating 
smaller and more peripheral clans and the eastern parts of Somaliland and also in the fact 
that the executive itself is associated with this type of structures and uses them in order to 
avoid unrest within and outside of the system.  The meager financial base of the state as it is 
not internationally recognized seems to be a mixed blessing. The geopolitical importance of 
Somaliland and Somalia has changed after the end of the Cold War. This in turn has changed 
the financing of the state apparatus. Money is put into reconstruction and the facilitating of 
social services by a multitude of legitimate sources and the state in fact has limited control 
over their resources. This in turn probably makes the patrimonialistic structuring of the 
state/society relationship less threatening to the upholding of post-conflict stability. No 
doubt would the recognition of Somaliland as a state make the cash flow into the country 
larger and the possibility to instigate a broad economic development would be there as it 
would be easier to explore the possibility of widening the economic base of Somaliland from 
being totally dependent on live stock import to also include e.g. the use of natural resources 
that are admittedly there, both oil and minerals. But without solving the problem of clan 
based patrimonialism which is a hinder for real vertical political integration it might as well 
be a dangerous development.  
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Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I have looked at how the elite within the system choose to act and to what 
degree their strategies are promoting stability and integration both horizontally on the elite 
level and vertical state/society integration. There seems to be sufficient horizontally elite 
integration in order to sustain stability but the strategies aimed at vertical integration are not 
strong enough and are hampered by the patrimonial tendency of the clan structure. The most 
important political achievements at the time of my fieldwork were the disarmament and 
rehabilitation of the militias and having been able to create a stable economic environment 
by introducing a local currency, the Somaliland Shilling. The lack of trust in the executive’s 
ability to promote development for all groups can become a problem in the future as is a 
limited economic base and the fact that the claim of independence is not entirely embraced 
by all elites and clans within Somaliland and by bordering Somali territories in the former 
Somalia.  
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Conclusion 
In this thesis I set out to look at integrating and disintegrating political strategies within a 
Somali context. My main interest was the lasting stability in the northern part of the former 
Somalia, Somaliland. The former British Protectorate declared itself independent in 1991 
and after successful local peace initiatives was able to settle the internal conflicts that were 
structured along clan interest in two reconciliation processes, the last ending in 1997. From 
then and up to my fieldwork in 2001 there had been no major conflicts and a rather well 
defined state apparatus based on power-sharing among all clans in Somaliland had been 
given the opportunity to exercise legitimate authority laying the grounds for economic, 
political and social reconstruction within a peaceful environment.  
My first research question was to look at integrating and disintegrating elite strategies in a 
historical perspective. In a Somali context the central idea of a Somali nation without a state 
has been the single most powerful ideology that to some extent has been able to make 
different Somali territories try to meet despite radically different colonial experiences. The 
merger of the Italian and the British Protectorate reflects the uniting force of pan-somalism. 
At the same time regional struggle for dominance over Somali inhabited areas made the 
realization of a Somali state that gathered all Somalis utopian and ultimately geo-politics 
structured around the West/communist divide lead up to the starting of the disintegration of 
the former Somalia which picked up pace at the end of the Ogaden war. 
The pastoral democracy is an equally powerful political idea that was given importance in 
the state building in Somaliland. The idea is that elite integration will provide a stable 
environment where all groups will have a say and where all parts of civil society can 
participate as it has its basis in a rather egalitarian non-hierarchical nomadic clan structure.   
Somalia was from the beginning of independence depending on economic aid from the 
outside world in order to function. Even before independence clientelistic structures were 
developed as the Somalis were integrated in the regional economy through trading live stock 
and an urban elite who had been skimming the live stock market as middlemen was ready to 
be absorbed by the state in order to get benefits from the money pouring into the state from 
various sources. The Cold war and the struggle for influence and the spread of political ideas 
made Somalia an attractive client for the adversaries, the US and Soviet. Soviet and China 
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provided military aid and communist ideas over time that led to the military côupe in 1969 
and the launching of scientific socialism. The politicising of clan was by then reaching 
unprecedented levels and the new regime sought to rid the country of the clan problem that 
was eating the state up from inside and seemed to be the single most important reason for the 
lack of economic development. The money did not make it down to the grass roots but 
became the prize for holding position. The Barre regime had little success in guiding a 
socialist development. Patrimonial structures had gotten so entrenched in the state that to 
stay in power and in control economic as well as military demanded the mobilization of ones 
own clan and the distribution of spoils to keep the support. The independence of Somaliland 
came as a response to social, economic and political processes that in the long run 
marginalized one of the larger groups in Somalia, the Isaaqs that mainly inhabit the former 
British Protectorate, Somaliland. Southern clans and the Darods in particular had gained 
prominence over time and the southern parts gained economic prominence over the north. In 
sum the particular development of the predatory state was due to the Cold war competition 
that gave the state economic and military resources of enormous proportions. This paired 
with inefficient economic policies led to underdevelopment of the productive forces and a 
dependence on clan networks in order to have a share in the resources available within the 
state. Being cut of from the state and possible influence and economic gain gave a further 
politicising of clan identities leading to disintegration. 
The political set-up in Somaliland was the result of local peace building and reconciliation 
processes that lasted for longer periods of time with few external participants with stake in 
the outcome. The clan structure was being used in order to get all groups represented in a 
system consisting of democratic elements but based on group representations. 
My second research question was to see in what way elite strategies within Somaliland at the 
time of the study were promoting stability and integration. My analysis showed that there 
were consociational elements in this structure of government that have been partly 
responsible for the lasting stability. All clans were represented. There was also an 
understanding between the different branches of what the cost of conflict would be and the 
system seemed to have quite some capacity to absorb differences at the elite level.  The 
absorption of the militias of different clans into the state’s army and police force had brought 
physical safety back to civil society and given a considerable amount of legitimacy to the 
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government. Introduction of a local currency further stabilized the markets giving economic 
growth at least in the urban and western areas.  
Still the problem of the integration of all groups and regions remained unsolved. The lack of 
economic development was seen as conscious strategies discriminating certain clans. The 
state it self was perceived as yet another centralized structure consequently feeding elites 
that had been around before independence in 1991 and continuously skimming the profits of 
being in position. New groups were integrated in order for business to go as usual. The 
constant rewarding and degradation of members of the political elite were interpreted as 
being the ultimate sign of that the patrimonial networks of the past still worked for the elite 
and deprived the ordinary Somalilanders of economic and social development and 
possibility to political participation.  The fact that Somaliland remains unrecognized and 
therefore can not enter into unilateral relationships with other states and that the region has 
lost its political importance as an area that other states would want to influence has made the 
cash flow rather modest and not skewed towards military aid as in the past. This means that 
the lack of vertical integration is probably less dangerous in the sense that no group will 
probably be able to gain enough military strength to be able to challenge the system as it is. 
Still the fact that there seems to be few signs of real political participation from below which 
is meaningful and able to promote a broader reconstruction process that includes all groups 
as in clans, social strata and regions is problematic and has to be dealt with. The patrimonial 
structuring of the clan relations vertically inherited from thirty years of independence with 
unlimited state resources paired with little or no development of the productive forces has to 
change in some way in order for this local solution to local conflicts to work out.  
The overall conclusion is that local initiatives and local/traditional structures are working 
and creating possibilities for reconstruction and lasting stability in Somaliland. The 
challenge is to make a good assessment how these local initiatives are functioning with more 
modern imposed structures like democracy. Indigenous African structures are structured by 
economic, social and political factors over time and this will in turn create limitation or 
possibilities when these structures meet the modern state. The main challenge is to be able to 
in the Somali case to change vertical patrimonialistic structures within clans to networks of 
real participation from below since the likelihood of clan loosing importance in near future is 
meagre in an economically challenged state like Somaliland. This change can only come 
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about from within the clan structure itself and possibly guided by the political elite in the 
state.   
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Appendix 1 
List of informants 
 
Date of interview Position within the political system Additional information 
February 25th 
2001 
Member of House of Elders I Influential and respected elder in 
Somaliland as a whole 
February 25th 
2001 
Minister I Short meeting, has held several 
positions in the government 
February 27th 
2001 
Administrative position in House of 
Elders 
Worked in House of Elders since the 
early nineties 
March 6th 2001 Vice Mayor Vice mayor in one of the important 
colonial villages in Somaliland 
March 7th 2001 Government employee Working with taxes and toll 
March 7th 2001 Mayor I  
March 22nd 2001 Member House of Representatives I Member of SNM 
March 25th 2001 Mayor II  
April 18th 2001 
No I 
Representative House of Elders II  
April 18th 2001 
No II 
Representative House of Elders III  
April 21st 2001 Minister II  
April 21st 2001 Member House of Representatives II Lawyer 
April 26th 2001 
No I 
Member House of Representatives III On the board of a larger business 
corporation and a professor 
Date of Interview Occupation Additional information 
April 4th 2001 Lawyer I Master of Social Science II Discussion with two younger men with 
university degrees. 
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March 7th 2001 Businessman within livestock Also a sultan, a traditional position; 
conversations over a day. 
March 17th 2001 UN employee Involved in civic education projects all 
over Somaliland 
April 18th 2001 
No III 
Executive in banking Member of new political party founded 
on Islamic principles 
April 14th 2001 Master of Political Science Master thesis written on clan politics 
April 25th 2001 Businessman Lived in Hargeysa during civil war an 
lost most of his properties 
April 26th 2001 
No II 
Radio host Expert on Somali oral culture heard on 
the radio, elder 
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Appendix 2 
Interview guide  
Possible respondents: members of House of Representatives, Guurti, other elders, the man 
woman in the street: 
 
Representation: 
1. Do you know how many representatives your group has in the elected organs? 
2. Do you know how the appropriate number of representatives was decided? 
3. Is the number of representatives according to your group’s size or according to their 
distribution in regions or are there other criteria that has decided the number? 
4. Is the number right in your opinion? 
5. Can you think of reasons for changing the number of representatives for your group? 
6. Has such changes occurred over the last ten years? 
7. Why do you think that the number has been fixed over the last ten years? 
 
Responsibility towards group and mobilizing structures: 
1. Do you see yourself as a representative of the clan you come from? 
2. Do people of your clan see you as their representative that is supposed safeguard their rights 
in the system? 
3. Whose interest do you think people think a representative should advocate? 
4. Why do you think some representatives are not reelected? 
5. Why were you/your representative reelected? 
6. In what instances do you deal with state officials? 
7. When a family or a group has a problem do they first go to someone in their clan for help? 
8. Is it important to go through your clan when you have something that you need to solve and 
when you need to deal with public officials? 
9. Do you think that who you are and the clan you belong to is important in those instances? 
10. How will the new party system work in Somaliland do you think? 
11. Could you mention at least three good things about the clan structure as it functions in 
Somaliland today? 
12. Could you mention at least three things about it that you find damaging? 
 
Conflicts: 
1. What is the common way of dealing with conflict?  
2. Does your clan/group have protection under the law equally to other clans/ groups? 
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3. Has the establishment of a central government of Somaliland and the conflict resolution in 
the mid 90s solved the conflictual issues that were between different clans? 
4. Can you give examples of conflicts in the early 90s?  
5. Can you give examples of conflicts today 
6. Are some conflicts kept out of the official system? 
7. Are there often conflicts about politics between Guurti/House of Representatives and the 
government/president? Examples. 
8. Are there often conflicts between the different clans within Guurti/House of 
Representatives? Examples 
9. Of these two types of conflict, which do you see as the most problematic? 
10. Could you mention at least three ways that the creation of a central state has benefited the 
people of Somaliland or your clan? 
 
Political opportunity structures: 
1. Are important political positions available to your group? 
2. Do you think someone in an important position should be able to help his clan specifically? 
3. Why/why not? 
4. Do other groups have easier access to positions and the decision-making process? 
5. Could you try to find some other characteristic of the people that have easier access than 
your group than clan belonging? 
6. Has your clan’s representation increased over the last ten years?  
7. In what way is clan important today in the political, economic and social sphere ? 
 
Sharing of economic burdens and benefits: 
1. Does every citizen pay taxes?  
2. Who then pay taxes today? Has there been a development in this area in your opinion over 
the last ten years? 
3. How does the state spend public funds? 
4. Do you think that the state spends the taxpayers’ money in a wise manner? 
5. Are there some aspects of the economic policy that you think promote tribalism between 
regions/different groups?  
6. Are there some aspects of the economic policy that you think is promoting integration and 
cooperation between regions/different clan groups? 
7. Do you think that your group has the same opportunities in employment and education as 
other groups? 
8. If so, what do you believe is the reason?  
9. Can you think of any demands that has emanated from your clan that the state has been 
sympathetic towards? 
10. Is the state able to accommodate any demands from civil society? 
11. Do you think that if accommodated they benefit everybody or just certain groups, economic 
or lineage?  
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